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authorSandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>2021-01-26 14:58:00 +0000
committerTrustedFirmware Code Review <review@review.trustedfirmware.org>2021-01-26 14:58:00 +0000
commit1ddf38e853cd7cb3fa02678f310ee8aa4f13bb22 (patch)
treee1a96388bc99bb5f46236439b7dcbdeaeb2f9b3b /plat/qemu
parent036e9c177f8ac4ece205607fba98b0a16dc45703 (diff)
parent83683ddd3d704e2d8c1fe9bef9eabb4639c0846a (diff)
Merge changes from topic "tp-feat-rng" into integration
* changes: plat/qemu: Use RNDR in stack protector Makefile: Add FEAT_RNG support define Define registers for FEAT_RNG support
Diffstat (limited to 'plat/qemu')
-rw-r--r--plat/qemu/common/qemu_stack_protector.c16
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/plat/qemu/common/qemu_stack_protector.c b/plat/qemu/common/qemu_stack_protector.c
index c226158ad6..15ce3d6d2c 100644
--- a/plat/qemu/common/qemu_stack_protector.c
+++ b/plat/qemu/common/qemu_stack_protector.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@@ -7,17 +7,25 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <arch_features.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
#define RANDOM_CANARY_VALUE ((u_register_t) 3288484550995823360ULL)
u_register_t plat_get_stack_protector_canary(void)
{
+#if ENABLE_FEAT_RNG
+ /* Use the RNDR instruction if the CPU supports it */
+ if (is_armv8_5_rng_present()) {
+ return read_rndr();
+ }
+#endif
+
/*
- * Ideally, a random number should be returned instead of the
+ * Ideally, a random number should be returned above. If a random
+ * number generator is not supported, return instead a
* combination of a timer's value and a compile-time constant.
- * As the virt platform does not have any random number generator,
- * this is better than nothing but not necessarily really secure.
+ * This is better than nothing but not necessarily really secure.
*/
return RANDOM_CANARY_VALUE ^ read_cntpct_el0();
}