ta: add early TA to seal and unseal Linux trusted keys

This patch adds an early TA which acts as Linux TEE bus device to
provide a service of sealing/unsealing of trusted keys in case platform
doesn't posses a TPM device or like.

To do sealing/unsealing we use system pseudo TA service to derive a
hardware unquie key to perform authenticated encryption/decryption
(using TEE_ALG_AES_GCM algo).

Also, this early TA only accepts login with a new private login method
specifically used by REE kernel (TEE_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL).

Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome@forissier.org>

5 files changed, 389 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/ta/trusted_keys/entry.c b/ta/trusted_keys/entry.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c6593ffe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ta/trusted_keys/entry.c
@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2020, Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <pta_system.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <string_ext.h>
+#include <tee_internal_api.h>
+#include <tee_internal_api_extensions.h>
+#include <trusted_keys.h>
+#include <util.h>
+
+#define IV_SIZE			16
+#define TAG_SIZE		16
+#define MAX_BUF_SIZE		512
+
+/*
+ * Acronym:
+ *
+ * TK - Trusted Key
+ */
+
+struct tk_blob_hdr {
+	uint8_t reserved;
+	uint8_t iv[IV_SIZE];
+	uint8_t tag[TAG_SIZE];
+	uint8_t enc_key[];
+};
+
+static TEE_Result get_random(uint32_t types, TEE_Param params[TEE_NUM_PARAMS])
+{
+	DMSG("Invoked TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM");
+
+	if (types != TEE_PARAM_TYPES(TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE))
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+
+	if (!params[0].memref.buffer || !params[0].memref.size)
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+
+	TEE_GenerateRandom(params[0].memref.buffer, params[0].memref.size);
+
+	return TEE_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static TEE_Result derive_unique_key(uint8_t *key, uint16_t key_size,
+				    uint8_t *extra, uint16_t extra_size)
+{
+	TEE_TASessionHandle sess = TEE_HANDLE_NULL;
+	TEE_Param params[TEE_NUM_PARAMS] = { };
+	TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
+	uint32_t ret_orig = 0;
+	uint32_t param_types = TEE_PARAM_TYPES(TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT,
+					       TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT,
+					       TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE,
+					       TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE);
+
+	res = TEE_OpenTASession(&(const TEE_UUID)PTA_SYSTEM_UUID,
+				TEE_TIMEOUT_INFINITE, 0, NULL, &sess,
+				&ret_orig);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	if (extra && extra_size) {
+		params[0].memref.buffer = extra;
+		params[0].memref.size = extra_size;
+	}
+
+	params[1].memref.buffer = key;
+	params[1].memref.size = key_size;
+
+	res = TEE_InvokeTACommand(sess, TEE_TIMEOUT_INFINITE,
+				  PTA_SYSTEM_DERIVE_TA_UNIQUE_KEY,
+				  param_types, params, &ret_orig);
+
+	TEE_CloseTASession(sess);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static TEE_Result huk_ae_encrypt(TEE_OperationHandle crypto_op, uint8_t *in,
+				 uint32_t in_sz, uint8_t *out, uint32_t *out_sz)
+{
+	TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
+	struct tk_blob_hdr *hdr = (struct tk_blob_hdr *)out;
+	uint32_t enc_key_len = in_sz;
+	uint32_t tag_len = TAG_SIZE;
+
+	hdr->reserved = 0;
+	TEE_GenerateRandom(hdr->iv, IV_SIZE);
+
+	res = TEE_AEInit(crypto_op, hdr->iv, IV_SIZE, TAG_SIZE * 8, 0, 0);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	res = TEE_AEEncryptFinal(crypto_op, in, in_sz, hdr->enc_key,
+				 &enc_key_len, hdr->tag, &tag_len);
+	if (res || tag_len != TAG_SIZE)
+		return TEE_ERROR_SECURITY;
+
+	if (ADD_OVERFLOW(enc_key_len, sizeof(*hdr), out_sz))
+		return TEE_ERROR_SECURITY;
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static TEE_Result huk_ae_decrypt(TEE_OperationHandle crypto_op, uint8_t *in,
+				 uint32_t in_sz, uint8_t *out, uint32_t *out_sz)
+{
+	TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
+	struct tk_blob_hdr *hdr = (struct tk_blob_hdr *)in;
+	uint32_t enc_key_len = 0;
+
+	if (SUB_OVERFLOW(in_sz, sizeof(*hdr), &enc_key_len))
+		return TEE_ERROR_SECURITY;
+
+	res = TEE_AEInit(crypto_op, hdr->iv, IV_SIZE, TAG_SIZE * 8, 0, 0);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	res = TEE_AEDecryptFinal(crypto_op, hdr->enc_key, enc_key_len, out,
+				 out_sz, hdr->tag, TAG_SIZE);
+	if (res)
+		res = TEE_ERROR_SECURITY;
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static TEE_Result huk_crypt(TEE_OperationMode mode, uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_sz,
+			    uint8_t *out, uint32_t *out_sz)
+{
+	TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
+	TEE_OperationHandle crypto_op = TEE_HANDLE_NULL;
+	TEE_ObjectHandle hkey = TEE_HANDLE_NULL;
+	uint8_t huk_key[TA_DERIVED_KEY_MAX_SIZE] = { };
+	TEE_Attribute attr = { };
+
+	res = TEE_AllocateOperation(&crypto_op, TEE_ALG_AES_GCM, mode,
+				    sizeof(huk_key) * 8);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	res = derive_unique_key(huk_key, sizeof(huk_key), NULL, 0);
+	if (res) {
+		EMSG("derive_unique_key failed: returned %#"PRIx32, res);
+		goto out_op;
+	}
+
+	res = TEE_AllocateTransientObject(TEE_TYPE_AES, sizeof(huk_key) * 8,
+					  &hkey);
+	if (res)
+		goto out_op;
+
+	attr.attributeID = TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE;
+	attr.content.ref.buffer = huk_key;
+	attr.content.ref.length = sizeof(huk_key);
+
+	res = TEE_PopulateTransientObject(hkey, &attr, 1);
+	if (res)
+		goto out_key;
+
+	res = TEE_SetOperationKey(crypto_op, hkey);
+	if (res)
+		goto out_key;
+
+	if (mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
+		res = huk_ae_encrypt(crypto_op, in, in_sz, out, out_sz);
+		if (res)
+			EMSG("huk_AE_encrypt failed: returned %#"PRIx32, res);
+	} else if (mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
+		res = huk_ae_decrypt(crypto_op, in, in_sz, out, out_sz);
+		if (res)
+			EMSG("huk_AE_decrypt failed: returned %#"PRIx32, res);
+	} else {
+		TEE_Panic(0);
+	}
+
+out_key:
+	TEE_FreeTransientObject(hkey);
+out_op:
+	TEE_FreeOperation(crypto_op);
+	memzero_explicit(huk_key, sizeof(huk_key));
+	return res;
+}
+
+static TEE_Result seal_trusted_key(uint32_t types,
+				   TEE_Param params[TEE_NUM_PARAMS])
+{
+	TEE_Result res = TEE_SUCCESS;
+	uint8_t *in = NULL;
+	uint32_t in_sz = 0;
+	uint8_t *out = NULL;
+	uint32_t out_sz = 0;
+
+	DMSG("Invoked TA_CMD_SEAL");
+
+	if (types != TEE_PARAM_TYPES(TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE))
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+
+	in = params[0].memref.buffer;
+	in_sz = params[0].memref.size;
+	out = params[1].memref.buffer;
+	out_sz = params[1].memref.size;
+
+	if (!in || !in_sz || in_sz > MAX_BUF_SIZE)
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+	if ((!out && out_sz) ||
+	    (out && !ALIGNMENT_IS_OK(out, struct tk_blob_hdr)) ||
+	    out_sz > MAX_BUF_SIZE)
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+
+	if ((in_sz + sizeof(struct tk_blob_hdr)) > out_sz) {
+		params[1].memref.size = in_sz + sizeof(struct tk_blob_hdr);
+		return TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
+	}
+
+	res = huk_crypt(TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT, in, in_sz, out, &out_sz);
+	if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
+		assert(out_sz == in_sz + sizeof(struct tk_blob_hdr));
+		params[1].memref.size = out_sz;
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static TEE_Result unseal_trusted_key(uint32_t types,
+				     TEE_Param params[TEE_NUM_PARAMS])
+{
+	TEE_Result res = TEE_SUCCESS;
+	uint8_t *in = NULL;
+	uint32_t in_sz = 0;
+	uint8_t *out = NULL;
+	uint32_t out_sz = 0;
+
+	DMSG("Invoked TA_CMD_UNSEAL");
+
+	if (types != TEE_PARAM_TYPES(TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE,
+				     TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE))
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+
+	in = params[0].memref.buffer;
+	in_sz = params[0].memref.size;
+	out = params[1].memref.buffer;
+	out_sz = params[1].memref.size;
+
+	if (!in || !ALIGNMENT_IS_OK(in, struct tk_blob_hdr) ||
+	    in_sz <= sizeof(struct tk_blob_hdr) || in_sz > MAX_BUF_SIZE)
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+	if ((!out && out_sz) || out_sz > MAX_BUF_SIZE)
+		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+
+	if (in_sz > (out_sz + sizeof(struct tk_blob_hdr))) {
+		params[1].memref.size = in_sz - sizeof(struct tk_blob_hdr);
+		return TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
+	}
+
+	res = huk_crypt(TEE_MODE_DECRYPT, in, in_sz, out, &out_sz);
+	if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
+		assert(out_sz == in_sz - sizeof(struct tk_blob_hdr));
+		params[1].memref.size = out_sz;
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+TEE_Result TA_CreateEntryPoint(void)
+{
+	return TEE_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void TA_DestroyEntryPoint(void)
+{
+}
+
+TEE_Result TA_OpenSessionEntryPoint(uint32_t pt __unused,
+				    TEE_Param params[TEE_NUM_PARAMS] __unused,
+				    void **session __unused)
+{
+	TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
+	TEE_PropSetHandle h = TEE_HANDLE_NULL;
+	TEE_Identity id = { };
+
+	res = TEE_AllocatePropertyEnumerator(&h);
+	if (res)
+		goto out;
+
+	TEE_StartPropertyEnumerator(h, TEE_PROPSET_CURRENT_CLIENT);
+
+	res = TEE_GetPropertyAsIdentity(h, NULL, &id);
+	if (res)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (id.login != TEE_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL)
+		res = TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+out:
+	if (h)
+		TEE_FreePropertyEnumerator(h);
+	return res;
+}
+
+void TA_CloseSessionEntryPoint(void *sess __unused)
+{
+}
+
+TEE_Result TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint(void *sess __unused, uint32_t cmd,
+				      uint32_t pt,
+				      TEE_Param params[TEE_NUM_PARAMS])
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM:
+		return get_random(pt, params);
+	case TA_CMD_SEAL:
+		return seal_trusted_key(pt, params);
+	case TA_CMD_UNSEAL:
+		return unseal_trusted_key(pt, params);
+	default:
+		EMSG("Command ID %#"PRIx32" is not supported", cmd);
+		return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/ta/trusted_keys/include/trusted_keys.h b/ta/trusted_keys/include/trusted_keys.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1571b370
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ta/trusted_keys/include/trusted_keys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2020, Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#ifndef TRUSTED_KEYS_H
+#define TRUSTED_KEYS_H
+
+#define TRUSTED_KEYS_UUID { 0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, \
+		{ 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c } }
+
+/*
+ * Get random data for symmetric key
+ *
+ * [out]     memref[0]        Random data
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM	0x0
+
+/*
+ * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in]      memref[0]        Plain key
+ * [out]     memref[1]        Sealed key datablob
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_SEAL		0x1
+
+/*
+ * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key
+ *
+ * [in]      memref[0]        Sealed key datablob
+ * [out]     memref[1]        Plain key
+ */
+#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL		0x2
+
+#endif /* TRUSTED_KEYS_H */
diff --git a/ta/trusted_keys/sub.mk b/ta/trusted_keys/sub.mk
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f1b35c03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ta/trusted_keys/sub.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+global-incdirs-y += include
+global-incdirs-y += .
+srcs-y += entry.c
diff --git a/ta/trusted_keys/user_ta.mk b/ta/trusted_keys/user_ta.mk
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bcb59c08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ta/trusted_keys/user_ta.mk
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+user-ta-uuid := f04a0fe7-1f5d-4b9b-abf7-619b85b4ce8c
diff --git a/ta/trusted_keys/user_ta_header_defines.h b/ta/trusted_keys/user_ta_header_defines.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2fc6689a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ta/trusted_keys/user_ta_header_defines.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#ifndef USER_TA_HEADER_DEFINES_H
+#define USER_TA_HEADER_DEFINES_H
+
+#include <trusted_keys.h>
+
+#define TA_UUID				TRUSTED_KEYS_UUID
+
+#define TA_FLAGS			(TA_FLAG_SINGLE_INSTANCE | \
+					 TA_FLAG_MULTI_SESSION | \
+					 TA_FLAG_DEVICE_ENUM)
+
+#define TA_STACK_SIZE			(4 * 1024)
+#define TA_DATA_SIZE			(16 * 1024)
+
+#endif /*USER_TA_HEADER_DEFINES_H*/