diff options
| author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> | 2012-01-30 08:17:26 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | John Rigby <john.rigby@linaro.org> | 2012-06-21 05:16:39 -0600 |
| commit | 3fda2b12683914126613d3b0e96187b23d7b6888 (patch) | |
| tree | c1235d95e6f29cc73f1e7b59d8cb52d791370876 /security/apparmor | |
| parent | f6fca953675ad90a97f1759c7a66241640c1b249 (diff) | |
UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Disable Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
subverting privileged binaries.
This patch completely breaks apparmor. Someone who understands (and
uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index b81ea10a17a..507dd8583b0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -360,6 +360,10 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->cred_prepared) return 0; + /* XXX: no_new_privs is not usable with AppArmor yet */ + if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) + return -EPERM; + cxt = bprm->cred->security; BUG_ON(!cxt); |