diff options
author | Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> | 2012-02-15 20:45:54 -0600 |
---|---|---|
committer | John Rigby <john.rigby@linaro.org> | 2012-06-23 23:19:49 -0600 |
commit | 22d6609536e74efaa65e4f9de0b4996f27a631b2 (patch) | |
tree | ab7bee48fa96316ea8cb5d618c9f751c4ebd9b0a | |
parent | 5e89132a885a357be5c95107e1669515a232369f (diff) |
UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a
seccomp filter. Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower
16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno. 16-bits is more than
enough for the errno-base.h calls.
Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that
violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality
for kernel attack surface reduction. For example, a linux container
could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop
all new ones with errnos. This would keep a logically static attack
surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure
without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call.
v15: - use audit_seccomp and add a skip label. (eparis@redhat.com)
- clean up and pad out return codes (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - no change/rebase
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - move to WARN_ON if filter is NULL
(oleg@redhat.com, luto@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org)
- return immediately for filter==NULL (keescook@chromium.org)
- change evaluation to only compare the ACTION so that layered
errnos don't result in the lowest one being returned.
(keeschook@chromium.org)
v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@chromium.org)
v10: - change loaders to fn
v9: - n/a
v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value.
- reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later.
- made the for loop a little less indent-y
v7: - introduced
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
-rw-r--r-- | arch/Kconfig | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/seccomp.h | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 47 |
3 files changed, 53 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 91c2c730fc1..139bf64a01f 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -220,8 +220,10 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER bool help This symbol should be selected by an architecure if it provides - asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments() and - syscall_get_arch(). + asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments(), + syscall_get_arch(), and syscall_set_return_value(). Additionally, + its system call entry path must respect a return value of -1 from + __secure_computing_int() and/or secure_computing(). config SECCOMP_FILTER def_bool y diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index ce980a8ee87..12bb2e31ed1 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -12,13 +12,14 @@ /* * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value. - * The bottom 16-bits are reserved for future use. + * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data. * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most. * * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always * selects the least permissive choice. */ #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL 0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */ +#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */ #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */ /* Masks for the return value sections. */ @@ -64,11 +65,17 @@ struct seccomp { struct seccomp_filter *filter; }; -extern void __secure_computing(int); -static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall) +/* + * Direct callers to __secure_computing should be updated as + * CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER propagates. + */ +extern void __secure_computing(int) __deprecated; +extern int __secure_computing_int(int); +static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall) { if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP))) - __secure_computing(this_syscall); + return __secure_computing_int(this_syscall); + return 0; } extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void); diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index be81d2ed60b..118368fce85 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -197,15 +197,20 @@ static int seccomp_chk_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall) { struct seccomp_filter *f; - u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL; + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; + + /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ + if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL)) + return SECCOMP_RET_KILL; + /* * All filters are evaluated in order of youngest to oldest. The lowest - * BPF return value always takes priority. + * BPF return value (ignoring the DATA) always takes priority. */ for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) { - ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns); - if (ret != SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) - break; + u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns); + if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) + ret = cur_ret; } return ret; } @@ -345,9 +350,18 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = { void __secure_computing(int this_syscall) { + /* Filter calls should never use this function. */ + BUG_ON(current->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER); + __secure_computing_int(this_syscall); +} + +int __secure_computing_int(int this_syscall) +{ int mode = current->seccomp.mode; int exit_sig = 0; int *syscall; + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL; + int data; switch (mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: @@ -358,14 +372,26 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall) #endif do { if (*syscall == this_syscall) - return; + return 0; } while (*++syscall); exit_sig = SIGKILL; break; #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: - if (seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall) == SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) - return; + ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall); + data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; + switch (code & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) { + case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: + /* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */ + syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current), + -data, 0); + goto skip; + case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: + return 0; + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL: + default: + break; + } exit_sig = SIGSYS; break; #endif @@ -376,8 +402,11 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall) #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG dump_stack(); #endif - audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_code, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret); do_exit(exit_sig); +skip: + audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret); + return -1; } long prctl_get_seccomp(void) |