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-rw-r--r--docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst32
-rw-r--r--tools/virtiofsd/helper.c1
-rw-r--r--tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c15
3 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
index 07ac0be551..0c0560203c 100644
--- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
+++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
@@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ Options
* posix_acl|no_posix_acl -
Enable/disable posix acl support. Posix ACLs are disabled by default.
+ * security_label|no_security_label -
+ Enable/disable security label support. Security labels are disabled by
+ default. This will allow client to send a MAC label of file during
+ file creation. Typically this is expected to be SELinux security
+ label. Server will try to set that label on newly created file
+ atomically wherever possible.
+
.. option:: --socket-path=PATH
Listen on vhost-user UNIX domain socket at PATH.
@@ -348,6 +355,31 @@ client arguments or lists returned from the host. This stops
the client seeing any 'security.' attributes on the server and
stops it setting any.
+SELinux support
+---------------
+One can enable support for SELinux by running virtiofsd with option
+"-o security_label". But this will try to save guest's security context
+in xattr security.selinux on host and it might fail if host's SELinux
+policy does not permit virtiofsd to do this operation.
+
+Hence, it is preferred to remap guest's "security.selinux" xattr to say
+"trusted.virtiofs.security.selinux" on host.
+
+"-o xattrmap=:map:security.selinux:trusted.virtiofs.:"
+
+This will make sure that guest and host's SELinux xattrs on same file
+remain separate and not interfere with each other. And will allow both
+host and guest to implement their own separate SELinux policies.
+
+Setting trusted xattr on host requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. So one will need
+add this capability to daemon.
+
+"-o modcaps=+sys_admin"
+
+Giving CAP_SYS_ADMIN increases the risk on system. Now virtiofsd is more
+powerful and if gets compromised, it can do lot of damage to host system.
+So keep this trade-off in my mind while making a decision.
+
Examples
--------
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
index a8295d975a..e226fc590f 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ void fuse_cmdline_help(void)
" default: no_allow_direct_io\n"
" -o announce_submounts Announce sub-mount points to the guest\n"
" -o posix_acl/no_posix_acl Enable/Disable posix_acl. (default: disabled)\n"
+ " -o security_label/no_security_label Enable/Disable security label. (default: disabled)\n"
);
}
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index f5d584e18a..4742be1d1e 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ struct lo_data {
int user_posix_acl, posix_acl;
/* Keeps track if /proc/<pid>/attr/fscreate should be used or not */
bool use_fscreate;
+ int user_security_label;
};
static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
@@ -215,6 +216,8 @@ static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
{ "no_killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 0 },
{ "posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 1 },
{ "no_posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 0 },
+ { "security_label", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_security_label), 1 },
+ { "no_security_label", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_security_label), 0 },
FUSE_OPT_END
};
static bool use_syslog = false;
@@ -808,6 +811,17 @@ static void lo_init(void *userdata, struct fuse_conn_info *conn)
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling posix_acl\n");
conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL;
}
+
+ if (lo->user_security_label == 1) {
+ if (!(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX)) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "lo_init: Can not enable security label."
+ " kernel does not support FUSE_SECURITY_CTX capability.\n");
+ }
+ conn->want |= FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX;
+ } else {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling security label\n");
+ conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX;
+ }
}
static void lo_getattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino,
@@ -4288,6 +4302,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
.proc_self_task = -1,
.user_killpriv_v2 = -1,
.user_posix_acl = -1,
+ .user_security_label = -1,
};
struct lo_map_elem *root_elem;
struct lo_map_elem *reserve_elem;