diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/analyzer/engine.cc | 320 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/doc/extend.texi | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-1.c | 88 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-misuses.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c | 93 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c | 32 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h | 91 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h | 15 |
12 files changed, 791 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc b/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc index 8b6f4c83f0f..243235e4cd4 100644 --- a/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc +++ b/gcc/analyzer/engine.cc @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ along with GCC; see the file COPYING3. If not see #include "plugin.h" #include "target.h" #include <memory> +#include "stringpool.h" +#include "attribs.h" +#include "tree-dfa.h" /* For an overview, see gcc/doc/analyzer.texi. */ @@ -2287,6 +2290,116 @@ exploded_graph::~exploded_graph () delete (*iter).second; } +/* Subroutine for use when implementing __attribute__((tainted_args)) + on functions and on function pointer fields in structs. + + Called on STATE representing a call to FNDECL. + Mark all params of FNDECL in STATE as "tainted". Mark the value of all + regions pointed to by params of FNDECL as "tainted". + + Return true if successful; return false if the "taint" state machine + was not found. */ + +static bool +mark_params_as_tainted (program_state *state, tree fndecl, + const extrinsic_state &ext_state) +{ + unsigned taint_sm_idx; + if (!ext_state.get_sm_idx_by_name ("taint", &taint_sm_idx)) + return false; + sm_state_map *smap = state->m_checker_states[taint_sm_idx]; + + const state_machine &sm = ext_state.get_sm (taint_sm_idx); + state_machine::state_t tainted = sm.get_state_by_name ("tainted"); + + region_model_manager *mgr = ext_state.get_model_manager (); + + function *fun = DECL_STRUCT_FUNCTION (fndecl); + gcc_assert (fun); + + for (tree iter_parm = DECL_ARGUMENTS (fndecl); iter_parm; + iter_parm = DECL_CHAIN (iter_parm)) + { + tree param = iter_parm; + if (tree parm_default_ssa = ssa_default_def (fun, iter_parm)) + param = parm_default_ssa; + const region *param_reg = state->m_region_model->get_lvalue (param, NULL); + const svalue *init_sval = mgr->get_or_create_initial_value (param_reg); + smap->set_state (state->m_region_model, init_sval, + tainted, NULL /*origin_new_sval*/, ext_state); + if (POINTER_TYPE_P (TREE_TYPE (param))) + { + const region *pointee_reg = mgr->get_symbolic_region (init_sval); + /* Mark "*param" as tainted. */ + const svalue *init_pointee_sval + = mgr->get_or_create_initial_value (pointee_reg); + smap->set_state (state->m_region_model, init_pointee_sval, + tainted, NULL /*origin_new_sval*/, ext_state); + } + } + + return true; +} + +/* Custom event for use by tainted_args_function_info when a function + has been marked with __attribute__((tainted_args)). */ + +class tainted_args_function_custom_event : public custom_event +{ +public: + tainted_args_function_custom_event (location_t loc, tree fndecl, int depth) + : custom_event (loc, fndecl, depth), + m_fndecl (fndecl) + { + } + + label_text get_desc (bool can_colorize) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + return make_label_text + (can_colorize, + "function %qE marked with %<__attribute__((tainted_args))%>", + m_fndecl); + } + +private: + tree m_fndecl; +}; + +/* Custom exploded_edge info for top-level calls to a function + marked with __attribute__((tainted_args)). */ + +class tainted_args_function_info : public custom_edge_info +{ +public: + tainted_args_function_info (tree fndecl) + : m_fndecl (fndecl) + {} + + void print (pretty_printer *pp) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + pp_string (pp, "call to tainted_args function"); + }; + + bool update_model (region_model *, + const exploded_edge *, + region_model_context *) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + /* No-op. */ + return true; + } + + void add_events_to_path (checker_path *emission_path, + const exploded_edge &) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + emission_path->add_event + (new tainted_args_function_custom_event + (DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION (m_fndecl), m_fndecl, 0)); + } + +private: + tree m_fndecl; +}; + /* Ensure that there is an exploded_node representing an external call to FUN, adding it to the worklist if creating it. @@ -2313,14 +2426,25 @@ exploded_graph::add_function_entry (function *fun) program_state state (m_ext_state); state.push_frame (m_ext_state, fun); + custom_edge_info *edge_info = NULL; + + if (lookup_attribute ("tainted_args", DECL_ATTRIBUTES (fun->decl))) + { + if (mark_params_as_tainted (&state, fun->decl, m_ext_state)) + edge_info = new tainted_args_function_info (fun->decl); + } + if (!state.m_valid) return NULL; exploded_node *enode = get_or_create_node (point, state, NULL); if (!enode) - return NULL; + { + delete edge_info; + return NULL; + } - add_edge (m_origin, enode, NULL); + add_edge (m_origin, enode, NULL, edge_info); m_functions_with_enodes.add (fun); @@ -2634,6 +2758,187 @@ toplevel_function_p (function *fun, logger *logger) return true; } +/* Custom event for use by tainted_call_info when a callback field has been + marked with __attribute__((tainted_args)), for labelling the field. */ + +class tainted_args_field_custom_event : public custom_event +{ +public: + tainted_args_field_custom_event (tree field) + : custom_event (DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION (field), NULL_TREE, 0), + m_field (field) + { + } + + label_text get_desc (bool can_colorize) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + return make_label_text (can_colorize, + "field %qE of %qT" + " is marked with %<__attribute__((tainted_args))%>", + m_field, DECL_CONTEXT (m_field)); + } + +private: + tree m_field; +}; + +/* Custom event for use by tainted_call_info when a callback field has been + marked with __attribute__((tainted_args)), for labelling the function used + in that callback. */ + +class tainted_args_callback_custom_event : public custom_event +{ +public: + tainted_args_callback_custom_event (location_t loc, tree fndecl, int depth, + tree field) + : custom_event (loc, fndecl, depth), + m_field (field) + { + } + + label_text get_desc (bool can_colorize) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + return make_label_text (can_colorize, + "function %qE used as initializer for field %qE" + " marked with %<__attribute__((tainted_args))%>", + m_fndecl, m_field); + } + +private: + tree m_field; +}; + +/* Custom edge info for use when adding a function used by a callback field + marked with '__attribute__((tainted_args))'. */ + +class tainted_args_call_info : public custom_edge_info +{ +public: + tainted_args_call_info (tree field, tree fndecl, location_t loc) + : m_field (field), m_fndecl (fndecl), m_loc (loc) + {} + + void print (pretty_printer *pp) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + pp_string (pp, "call to tainted field"); + }; + + bool update_model (region_model *, + const exploded_edge *, + region_model_context *) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + /* No-op. */ + return true; + } + + void add_events_to_path (checker_path *emission_path, + const exploded_edge &) const FINAL OVERRIDE + { + /* Show the field in the struct declaration, e.g. + "(1) field 'store' is marked with '__attribute__((tainted_args))'" */ + emission_path->add_event + (new tainted_args_field_custom_event (m_field)); + + /* Show the callback in the initializer + e.g. + "(2) function 'gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store' used as initializer + for field 'store' marked with '__attribute__((tainted_args))'". */ + emission_path->add_event + (new tainted_args_callback_custom_event (m_loc, m_fndecl, 0, m_field)); + } + +private: + tree m_field; + tree m_fndecl; + location_t m_loc; +}; + +/* Given an initializer at LOC for FIELD marked with + '__attribute__((tainted_args))' initialized with FNDECL, add an + entrypoint to FNDECL to EG (and to its worklist) where the params to + FNDECL are marked as tainted. */ + +static void +add_tainted_args_callback (exploded_graph *eg, tree field, tree fndecl, + location_t loc) +{ + logger *logger = eg->get_logger (); + + LOG_SCOPE (logger); + + if (!gimple_has_body_p (fndecl)) + return; + + const extrinsic_state &ext_state = eg->get_ext_state (); + + function *fun = DECL_STRUCT_FUNCTION (fndecl); + gcc_assert (fun); + + program_point point + = program_point::from_function_entry (eg->get_supergraph (), fun); + program_state state (ext_state); + state.push_frame (ext_state, fun); + + if (!mark_params_as_tainted (&state, fndecl, ext_state)) + return; + + if (!state.m_valid) + return; + + exploded_node *enode = eg->get_or_create_node (point, state, NULL); + if (logger) + { + if (enode) + logger->log ("created EN %i for tainted_args %qE entrypoint", + enode->m_index, fndecl); + else + { + logger->log ("did not create enode for tainted_args %qE entrypoint", + fndecl); + return; + } + } + + tainted_args_call_info *info + = new tainted_args_call_info (field, fndecl, loc); + eg->add_edge (eg->get_origin (), enode, NULL, info); +} + +/* Callback for walk_tree for finding callbacks within initializers; + ensure that any callback initializer where the corresponding field is + marked with '__attribute__((tainted_args))' is treated as an entrypoint + to the analysis, special-casing that the inputs to the callback are + untrustworthy. */ + +static tree +add_any_callbacks (tree *tp, int *, void *data) +{ + exploded_graph *eg = (exploded_graph *)data; + if (TREE_CODE (*tp) == CONSTRUCTOR) + { + /* Find fields with the "tainted_args" attribute. + walk_tree only walks the values, not the index values; + look at the index values. */ + unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT idx; + constructor_elt *ce; + + for (idx = 0; vec_safe_iterate (CONSTRUCTOR_ELTS (*tp), idx, &ce); + idx++) + if (ce->index && TREE_CODE (ce->index) == FIELD_DECL) + if (lookup_attribute ("tainted_args", DECL_ATTRIBUTES (ce->index))) + { + tree value = ce->value; + if (TREE_CODE (value) == ADDR_EXPR + && TREE_CODE (TREE_OPERAND (value, 0)) == FUNCTION_DECL) + add_tainted_args_callback (eg, ce->index, + TREE_OPERAND (value, 0), + EXPR_LOCATION (value)); + } + } + + return NULL_TREE; +} + /* Add initial nodes to EG, with entrypoints for externally-callable functions. */ @@ -2659,6 +2964,17 @@ exploded_graph::build_initial_worklist () logger->log ("did not create enode for %qE entrypoint", fun->decl); } } + + /* Find callbacks that are reachable from global initializers. */ + varpool_node *vpnode; + FOR_EACH_VARIABLE (vpnode) + { + tree decl = vpnode->decl; + tree init = DECL_INITIAL (decl); + if (!init) + continue; + walk_tree (&init, add_any_callbacks, this, NULL); + } } /* The main loop of the analysis. diff --git a/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c b/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c index bdf72ce385c..4fb5dbd1409 100644 --- a/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c +++ b/gcc/c-family/c-attribs.c @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ static tree handle_no_profile_instrument_function_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int, bool *); static tree handle_malloc_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int, bool *); static tree handle_dealloc_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int, bool *); +static tree handle_tainted_args_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int, bool *); static tree handle_returns_twice_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int, bool *); static tree handle_no_limit_stack_attribute (tree *, tree, tree, int, bool *); @@ -548,6 +549,8 @@ const struct attribute_spec c_common_attribute_table[] = handle_objc_nullability_attribute, NULL }, { "*dealloc", 1, 2, true, false, false, false, handle_dealloc_attribute, NULL }, + { "tainted_args", 0, 0, true, false, false, false, + handle_tainted_args_attribute, NULL }, { NULL, 0, 0, false, false, false, false, NULL, NULL } }; @@ -5774,6 +5777,39 @@ handle_objc_nullability_attribute (tree *node, tree name, tree args, return NULL_TREE; } +/* Handle a "tainted_args" attribute; arguments as in + struct attribute_spec.handler. */ + +static tree +handle_tainted_args_attribute (tree *node, tree name, tree, int, + bool *no_add_attrs) +{ + if (TREE_CODE (*node) != FUNCTION_DECL + && TREE_CODE (*node) != FIELD_DECL) + { + warning (OPT_Wattributes, "%qE attribute ignored; valid only " + "for functions and function pointer fields", + name); + *no_add_attrs = true; + return NULL_TREE; + } + + if (TREE_CODE (*node) == FIELD_DECL + && !(TREE_CODE (TREE_TYPE (*node)) == POINTER_TYPE + && TREE_CODE (TREE_TYPE (TREE_TYPE (*node))) == FUNCTION_TYPE)) + { + warning (OPT_Wattributes, "%qE attribute ignored;" + " field must be a function pointer", + name); + *no_add_attrs = true; + return NULL_TREE; + } + + *no_add_attrs = false; /* OK */ + + return NULL_TREE; +} + /* Attempt to partially validate a single attribute ATTR as if it were to be applied to an entity OPER. */ diff --git a/gcc/doc/extend.texi b/gcc/doc/extend.texi index 637124a7172..20a5944256a 100644 --- a/gcc/doc/extend.texi +++ b/gcc/doc/extend.texi @@ -2512,7 +2512,8 @@ variable declarations (@pxref{Variable Attributes}), labels (@pxref{Label Attributes}), enumerators (@pxref{Enumerator Attributes}), statements (@pxref{Statement Attributes}), -and types (@pxref{Type Attributes}). +types (@pxref{Type Attributes}), +and on field declarations (for @code{tainted_args}). There is some overlap between the purposes of attributes and pragmas (@pxref{Pragmas,,Pragmas Accepted by GCC}). It has been @@ -4009,6 +4010,26 @@ addition to creating a symbol version (as if @code{"@var{name2}@@@var{nodename}"} was used) the version will be also used to resolve @var{name2} by the linker. +@item tainted_args +@cindex @code{tainted_args} function attribute +The @code{tainted_args} attribute is used to specify that a function is called +in a way that requires sanitization of its arguments, such as a system +call in an operating system kernel. Such a function can be considered part +of the ``attack surface'' of the program. The attribute can be used both +on function declarations, and on field declarations containing function +pointers. In the latter case, any function used as an initializer of +such a callback field will be treated as being called with tainted +arguments. + +The analyzer will pay particular attention to such functions when both +@option{-fanalyzer} and @option{-fanalyzer-checker=taint} are supplied, +potentially issuing warnings guarded by +@option{-Wanalyzer-tainted-allocation-size}, +@option{-Wanalyzer-tainted-array-index}, +@option{-Wanalyzer-tainted-divisor}, +@option{-Wanalyzer-tainted-offset}, +and @option{-Wanalyzer-tainted-size}. + @item target_clones (@var{options}) @cindex @code{target_clones} function attribute The @code{target_clones} attribute is used to specify that a function diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-1.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e1d87c9cece --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-1.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +// TODO: remove need for this option +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */ + +#include "analyzer-decls.h" + +struct arg_buf +{ + int i; + int j; +}; + +/* Example of marking a function as tainted. */ + +void __attribute__((tainted_args)) +test_1 (int i, void *p, char *q) +{ + /* There should be a single enode, + for the "tainted" entry to the function. */ + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "1 processed enode" } */ + + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", i); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", p); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", q); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", *q); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + + struct arg_buf *args = p; + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->i); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->j); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ +} + +/* Example of marking a callback field as tainted. */ + +struct s2 +{ + void (*cb) (int, void *, char *) + __attribute__((tainted_args)); +}; + +/* Function not marked as tainted. */ + +void +test_2a (int i, void *p, char *q) +{ + /* There should be a single enode, + for the normal entry to the function. */ + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "1 processed enode" } */ + + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", i); /* { dg-warning "state: 'start'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", p); /* { dg-warning "state: 'start'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", q); /* { dg-warning "state: 'start'" } */ + + struct arg_buf *args = p; + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->i); /* { dg-warning "state: 'start'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->j); /* { dg-warning "state: 'start'" } */ +} + +/* Function referenced via t2b.cb, marked as "tainted". */ + +void +test_2b (int i, void *p, char *q) +{ + /* There should be two enodes + for the direct call, and the "tainted" entry to the function. */ + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "2 processed enodes" } */ +} + +/* Callback used via t2c.cb, marked as "tainted". */ +void +__analyzer_test_2c (int i, void *p, char *q) +{ + /* There should be a single enode, + for the "tainted" entry to the function. */ + __analyzer_dump_exploded_nodes (0); /* { dg-warning "1 processed enode" } */ + + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", i); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", p); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", q); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ +} + +struct s2 t2b = +{ + .cb = test_2b +}; + +struct s2 t2c = +{ + .cb = __analyzer_test_2c +}; diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-misuses.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-misuses.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4b0dc915059 --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/attr-tainted_args-misuses.c @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +int not_a_fn __attribute__ ((tainted_args)); /* { dg-warning "'tainted_args' attribute ignored; valid only for functions and function pointer fields" } */ + +struct s +{ + int f __attribute__ ((tainted_args)); /* { dg-warning "'tainted_args' attribute ignored; field must be a function pointer" } */ +}; diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b44be993568 --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2011-2210-1.c @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* "The osf_getsysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the + Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform does not properly + restrict the data size for GSI_GET_HWRPB operations, which allows + local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via + a crafted call." + + Fixed in 3d0475119d8722798db5e88f26493f6547a4bb5b on linux-2.6.39.y + in linux-stable. */ + +// TODO: remove need for this option: +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */ + +#include "analyzer-decls.h" +#include "test-uaccess.h" + +/* Adapted from include/linux/linkage.h. */ + +#define asmlinkage + +/* Adapted from include/linux/syscalls.h. */ + +#define __SC_DECL1(t1, a1) t1 a1 +#define __SC_DECL2(t2, a2, ...) t2 a2, __SC_DECL1(__VA_ARGS__) +#define __SC_DECL3(t3, a3, ...) t3 a3, __SC_DECL2(__VA_ARGS__) +#define __SC_DECL4(t4, a4, ...) t4 a4, __SC_DECL3(__VA_ARGS__) +#define __SC_DECL5(t5, a5, ...) t5 a5, __SC_DECL4(__VA_ARGS__) +#define __SC_DECL6(t6, a6, ...) t6 a6, __SC_DECL5(__VA_ARGS__) + +#define SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, ...) \ + __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define SYSCALL_DEFINE(name) asmlinkage long sys_##name +#define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...) \ + asmlinkage __attribute__((tainted_args)) \ + long sys##name(__SC_DECL##x(__VA_ARGS__)) + +#define SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(5, _##name, __VA_ARGS__) + +/* Adapted from arch/alpha/include/asm/hwrpb.h. */ + +struct hwrpb_struct { + unsigned long phys_addr; /* check: physical address of the hwrpb */ + unsigned long id; /* check: "HWRPB\0\0\0" */ + unsigned long revision; + unsigned long size; /* size of hwrpb */ + /* [...snip...] */ +}; + +extern struct hwrpb_struct *hwrpb; + +/* Adapted from arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c. */ + +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer, + unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void __user *, arg) +{ + /* [...snip...] */ + + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", nbytes); /* { dg-warning "tainted" } */ + + /* TODO: should have an event explaining why "nbytes" is treated as + attacker-controlled. */ + + /* case GSI_GET_HWRPB: */ + if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb)) + return -1; + + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", nbytes); /* { dg-warning "has_lb" } */ + + if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0) /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value 'nbytes' as size without upper-bounds checking" } */ + return -2; + + return 1; + + /* [...snip...] */ +} + +/* With the fix for the sense of the size comparison. */ + +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo_fixed, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer, + unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void __user *, arg) +{ + /* [...snip...] */ + + /* case GSI_GET_HWRPB: */ + if (nbytes > sizeof(*hwrpb)) + return -1; + if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0) /* { dg-bogus "attacker-controlled" } */ + return -2; + + return 1; + + /* [...snip...] */ +} diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..328c5799145 --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-1.c @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* See notes in this header. */ +#include "taint-CVE-2020-13143.h" + +// TODO: remove need for this option +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */ + +struct configfs_attribute { + /* [...snip...] */ + ssize_t (*store)(struct config_item *, const char *, size_t) /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) field 'store' of 'struct configfs_attribute' is marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted_args\\)\\)'" } */ + __attribute__((tainted_args)); /* (this is added). */ +}; +static inline struct gadget_info *to_gadget_info(struct config_item *item) +{ + return container_of(to_config_group(item), struct gadget_info, group); +} + +static ssize_t gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store(struct config_item *item, + const char *page, size_t len) +{ + struct gadget_info *gi = to_gadget_info(item); + char *name; + int ret; + +#if 0 + /* FIXME: this is the fix. */ + if (strlen(page) < len) + return -EOVERFLOW; +#endif + + name = kstrdup(page, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + if (name[len - 1] == '\n') /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without upper-bounds checking" } */ + name[len - 1] = '\0'; /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without upper-bounds checking" } */ + /* [...snip...] */ \ +} + +CONFIGFS_ATTR(gadget_dev_desc_, UDC); /* { dg-message "\\(2\\) function 'gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store' used as initializer for field 'store' marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted_args\\)\\)'" } */ diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c74a460b01e --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143-2.c @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* See notes in this header. */ +#include "taint-CVE-2020-13143.h" + +// TODO: remove need for this option +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */ + +struct configfs_attribute { + /* [...snip...] */ + ssize_t (*store)(struct config_item *, const char *, size_t) /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) field 'store' of 'struct configfs_attribute' is marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted_args\\)\\)'" } */ + __attribute__((tainted_args)); /* (this is added). */ +}; + +/* Highly simplified version. */ + +static ssize_t gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store(struct config_item *item, + const char *page, size_t len) +{ + /* TODO: ought to have state_change_event talking about where the tainted value comes from. */ + + char *name; + /* [...snip...] */ + + name = kstrdup(page, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + if (name[len - 1] == '\n') /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without upper-bounds checking" } */ + name[len - 1] = '\0'; /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value 'len \[^\n\r\]+' as offset without upper-bounds checking" } */ + /* [...snip...] */ + return 0; +} + +CONFIGFS_ATTR(gadget_dev_desc_, UDC); /* { dg-message "\\(2\\) function 'gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store' used as initializer for field 'store' marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted_args\\)\\)'" } */ diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0ba023539af --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-CVE-2020-13143.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* Shared header for the various taint-CVE-2020-13143.h tests. + + "gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store in drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c in the + Linux kernel 3.16 through 5.6.13 relies on kstrdup without considering + the possibility of an internal '\0' value, which allows attackers to + trigger an out-of-bounds read, aka CID-15753588bcd4." + + Fixed by 15753588bcd4bbffae1cca33c8ced5722477fe1f on linux-5.7.y + in linux-stable. */ + +// TODO: remove need for this option +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */ + +#include <stddef.h> + +/* Adapted from include/uapi/asm-generic/posix_types.h */ + +typedef unsigned int __kernel_size_t; +typedef int __kernel_ssize_t; + +/* Adapted from include/linux/types.h */ + +//typedef __kernel_size_t size_t; +typedef __kernel_ssize_t ssize_t; + +/* Adapted from include/linux/kernel.h */ + +#define container_of(ptr, type, member) ({ \ + void *__mptr = (void *)(ptr); \ + /* [...snip...] */ \ + ((type *)(__mptr - offsetof(type, member))); }) + +/* Adapted from include/linux/configfs.h */ + +struct config_item { + /* [...snip...] */ +}; + +struct config_group { + struct config_item cg_item; + /* [...snip...] */ +}; + +static inline struct config_group *to_config_group(struct config_item *item) +{ + return item ? container_of(item,struct config_group,cg_item) : NULL; +} + +#define CONFIGFS_ATTR(_pfx, _name) \ +static struct configfs_attribute _pfx##attr_##_name = { \ + /* [...snip...] */ \ + .store = _pfx##_name##_store, \ +} + +/* Adapted from include/linux/compiler.h */ + +#define __force + +/* Adapted from include/asm-generic/errno-base.h */ + +#define ENOMEM 12 /* Out of memory */ + +/* Adapted from include/linux/types.h */ + +#define __bitwise__ +typedef unsigned __bitwise__ gfp_t; + +/* Adapted from include/linux/gfp.h */ + +#define ___GFP_WAIT 0x10u +#define ___GFP_IO 0x40u +#define ___GFP_FS 0x80u +#define __GFP_WAIT ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_WAIT) +#define __GFP_IO ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_IO) +#define __GFP_FS ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_FS) +#define GFP_KERNEL (__GFP_WAIT | __GFP_IO | __GFP_FS) + +/* Adapted from include/linux/compiler_attributes.h */ + +#define __malloc __attribute__((__malloc__)) + +/* Adapted from include/linux/string.h */ + +extern char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc; + +/* Adapted from drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c */ + +struct gadget_info { + struct config_group group; + /* [...snip...] */ \ +}; diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..80d8f0b8247 --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-3.c @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +// TODO: remove need for this option: +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */ + +#include "analyzer-decls.h" +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +/* malloc with tainted size from a syscall. */ + +void *p; + +void __attribute__((tainted_args)) +test_1 (size_t sz) /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) function 'test_1' marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted_args\\)\\)'" } */ +{ + /* TODO: should have a message saying why "sz" is tainted, e.g. + "treating 'sz' as attacker-controlled because 'test_1' is marked with '__attribute__((tainted_args))'" */ + + p = malloc (sz); /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value 'sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds checking" "warning" } */ + /* { dg-message "\\(\[0-9\]+\\) use of attacker-controlled value 'sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds checking" "final event" { target *-*-* } .-1 } */ +} diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bd47097b1d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-alloc-4.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// TODO: remove need for this option: +/* { dg-additional-options "-fanalyzer-checker=taint" } */ + +#include "analyzer-decls.h" +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +/* malloc with tainted size from a syscall. */ + +struct arg_buf +{ + size_t sz; +}; + +void *p; + +void __attribute__((tainted_args)) +test_1 (void *data) /* { dg-message "\\(1\\) function 'test_1' marked with '__attribute__\\(\\(tainted_args\\)\\)'" } */ +{ + /* we should treat pointed-to-structs as tainted. */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", data); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + + struct arg_buf *args = data; + + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + __analyzer_dump_state ("taint", args->sz); /* { dg-warning "state: 'tainted'" } */ + + p = malloc (args->sz); /* { dg-warning "use of attacker-controlled value '\\*args.sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds checking" "warning" } */ + /* { dg-message "\\(\[0-9\]+\\) use of attacker-controlled value '\\*args.sz' as allocation size without upper-bounds checking" "final event" { target *-*-* } .-1 } */ +} diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..70c9d6309ef --- /dev/null +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* Shared header for testcases for copy_from_user/copy_to_user. */ + +/* Adapted from include/linux/compiler.h */ + +#define __user + +/* Adapted from include/asm-generic/uaccess.h */ + +extern int copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, long n) + __attribute__((access (write_only, 1, 3), + access (read_only, 2, 3))); + +extern long copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) + __attribute__((access (write_only, 1, 3), + access (read_only, 2, 3))); |