From 5fdf198c117a4b6dbcf5242f5136f7224ceff6ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thaddeus Serna Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 13:28:59 -0500 Subject: fix(docs): replace deprecated urls under tfa/docs Fixed internal links refrenced inside tfa/docs. Followed https://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/master/usage/restructuredtext/roles.html#ref-role for instrustion on how to link sections within other documents. Signed-off-by: Thaddeus Serna Change-Id: I8e7c090d98951b1e3d393ab5b1d6bcdaa1865c6f --- docs/perf/psci-performance-instr.rst | 17 ++++++++--------- docs/perf/psci-performance-juno.rst | 6 +++--- docs/perf/psci-performance-n1sdp.rst | 5 ++--- docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst | 2 ++ docs/threat_model/threat_model_el3_spm.rst | 16 ++++++++-------- docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst | 13 +++++++------ 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) (limited to 'docs') diff --git a/docs/perf/psci-performance-instr.rst b/docs/perf/psci-performance-instr.rst index 16f386fb9..41094b2a3 100644 --- a/docs/perf/psci-performance-instr.rst +++ b/docs/perf/psci-performance-instr.rst @@ -13,16 +13,17 @@ analysis. Performance Measurement Framework --------------------------------- -The Performance Measurement Framework `PMF`_ is a framework that provides -mechanisms for collecting and retrieving timestamps at runtime from the -Performance Measurement Unit (`PMU`_). The PMU is a generalized abstraction for -accessing CPU hardware registers used to measure hardware events. This means, -for instance, that the PMU might be used to place instrumentation points at -logical locations in code for tracing purposes. +The Performance Measurement Framework :ref:`PMF ` +is a framework that provides mechanisms for collecting and retrieving timestamps +at runtime from the Performance Measurement Unit +(:ref:`PMU `). +The PMU is a generalized abstraction for accessing CPU hardware registers used to +measure hardware events. This means, for instance, that the PMU might be used to +place instrumentation points at logical locations in code for tracing purposes. TF-A utilises the PMF as a backend for the two instrumentation services it provides--PSCI Statistics and Runtime Instrumentation. The PMF is used by -these services to facilitate collection and retrieval of timestamps. For +these services to facilitate collection and retrieval of timestamps. For instance, the PSCI Statistics service registers the PMF service ``psci_svc`` to track its residency statistics. @@ -112,6 +113,4 @@ was requested, it is captured in the warm boot path. *Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* -.. _PMF: ../design/firmware-design.html#performance-measurement-framework -.. _PMU: performance-monitoring-unit.html .. _PSCI: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0022/latest/ diff --git a/docs/perf/psci-performance-juno.rst b/docs/perf/psci-performance-juno.rst index 7a484b88e..d458d86ea 100644 --- a/docs/perf/psci-performance-juno.rst +++ b/docs/perf/psci-performance-juno.rst @@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ The following source trees and binaries were used: - TF-A [`v2.9-rc0`_] - TFTF [`v2.9-rc0`_] -Please see the Runtime Instrumentation `Testing Methodology`_ page for more -details. +Please see the Runtime Instrumentation :ref:`Testing Methodology +` +page for more details. Procedure --------- @@ -418,4 +419,3 @@ effects, given that these measurements are at the nano-second level. .. _Juno R1 platform: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/100122/latest/ .. _TF master as of 31/01/2017: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/?id=c38b36d .. _v2.9-rc0: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/?h=v2.9-rc0 -.. _Testing Methodology: ../perf/psci-performance-methodology.html diff --git a/docs/perf/psci-performance-n1sdp.rst b/docs/perf/psci-performance-n1sdp.rst index 70a1436a5..ae1b89b29 100644 --- a/docs/perf/psci-performance-n1sdp.rst +++ b/docs/perf/psci-performance-n1sdp.rst @@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ The following source trees and binaries were used: - TFTF [`v2.9-rc0`_] - SCP/MCP `Prebuilt Images`_ -Please see the Runtime Instrumentation `Testing Methodology`_ page for more -details. +Please see the Runtime Instrumentation :ref:`Testing Methodology +` page for more details. Procedure --------- @@ -200,4 +200,3 @@ core to the deepest power level. .. _user guide: https://gitlab.arm.com/arm-reference-solutions/arm-reference-solutions-docs/-/blob/master/docs/n1sdp/user-guide.rst .. _Prebuilt Images: https://downloads.trustedfirmware.org/tf-a/css_scp_2.11.0/n1sdp/release/ .. _N1SDP: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101489/latest -.. _Testing Methodology: ../perf/psci-performance-methodology.html \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst b/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst index 71ec9b1e6..41ec57ccf 100644 --- a/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst +++ b/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ are considered untrusted by TF-A. +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ +.. _threat_analysis: + *************** Threat Analysis *************** diff --git a/docs/threat_model/threat_model_el3_spm.rst b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_el3_spm.rst index c3af7a2d8..8adf3dfdb 100644 --- a/docs/threat_model/threat_model_el3_spm.rst +++ b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_el3_spm.rst @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ EL3 SPMC Threat Model ************ Introduction ************ -This document provides a threat model for the TF-A `EL3 Secure Partition Manager`_ +This document provides a threat model for the TF-A :ref:`EL3 Secure Partition Manager` (EL3 SPM) implementation. The EL3 SPM implementation is based on the `Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile`_ specification. @@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ Target of Evaluation ******************** In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the ``Secure Partition Manager Core`` component (SPMC) within the EL3 firmware. -The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the `Generic TF-A threat model`_. +The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model +`. The scope for this threat model is: @@ -70,8 +71,8 @@ Components outside of the broken lines are considered untrusted. Threat Analysis *************** -This threat model follows a similar methodology to the `Generic TF-A threat model`_. -The following sections define: +This threat model follows a similar methodology to the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model +`. The following sections define: - Trust boundaries - Assets @@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ The following threat agents are identified: Threat types ============ -The following threat categories as exposed in the `Generic TF-A threat model`_ +The following threat categories as exposed in the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model +` are re-used: - Spoofing @@ -642,9 +644,7 @@ element of the data flow diagram. --------------- -*Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* +*Copyright (c) 2022-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* .. _Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0077/latest -.. _EL3 Secure Partition Manager: ../components/el3-spmc.html -.. _Generic TF-A threat model: ./threat_model.html#threat-analysis .. _FF-A ACS: https://github.com/ARM-software/ff-a-acs/releases diff --git a/docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst index 9458a9fea..24a115bfa 100644 --- a/docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst +++ b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ SPMC Threat Model ************************ Introduction ************************ -This document provides a threat model for the TF-A `Secure Partition Manager`_ +This document provides a threat model for the TF-A :ref:`Secure Partition Manager` (SPM) implementation or more generally the S-EL2 reference firmware running on systems implementing the FEAT_SEL2 (formerly Armv8.4 Secure EL2) architecture extension. The SPM implementation is based on the `Arm Firmware Framework for @@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ Target of Evaluation ************************ In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the S-EL2 firmware or the ``Secure Partition Manager Core`` component (SPMC). -The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the `Generic TF-A threat model`_. +The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model +`. The scope for this threat model is: @@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ Components outside of the broken lines are considered untrusted. Threat Analysis ********************* -This threat model follows a similar methodology to the `Generic TF-A threat model`_. +This threat model follows a similar methodology to the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model +`. The following sections define: - Trust boundaries @@ -141,7 +143,8 @@ The following threat agents are identified: Threat types ============================ -The following threat categories as exposed in the `Generic TF-A threat model`_ +The following threat categories as exposed in the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model +` are re-used: - Spoofing @@ -1333,7 +1336,5 @@ element of the data flow diagram. *Copyright (c) 2021-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* .. _Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0077/latest -.. _Secure Partition Manager: ../components/secure-partition-manager.html -.. _Generic TF-A threat model: ./threat_model.html#threat-analysis .. _FF-A ACS: https://github.com/ARM-software/ff-a-acs/releases -- cgit v1.2.3