Merge remote-tracking branch 'net-next/master'

2 files changed, 19 insertions, 26 deletions

diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c
index b42b8577fc23..a7e0b16078df 100644
--- a/lib/nlattr.c
+++ b/lib/nlattr.c
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static int validate_nla(const struct nlattr *nla, int maxtype,
  * @len: length of attribute stream
  * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected
  * @policy: validation policy
+ * @extack: extended ACK report struct
  *
  * Validates all attributes in the specified attribute stream against the
  * specified policy. Attributes with a type exceeding maxtype will be
@@ -120,20 +121,23 @@ static int validate_nla(const struct nlattr *nla, int maxtype,
  * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code.
  */
 int nla_validate(const struct nlattr *head, int len, int maxtype,
-		 const struct nla_policy *policy)
+		 const struct nla_policy *policy,
+		 struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
 	const struct nlattr *nla;
-	int rem, err;
+	int rem;
 
 	nla_for_each_attr(nla, head, len, rem) {
-		err = validate_nla(nla, maxtype, policy);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto errout;
+		int err = validate_nla(nla, maxtype, policy);
+
+		if (err < 0) {
+			if (extack)
+				extack->bad_attr = nla;
+			return err;
+		}
 	}
 
-	err = 0;
-errout:
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(nla_validate);
 
@@ -180,7 +184,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(nla_policy_len);
  * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code.
  */
 int nla_parse(struct nlattr **tb, int maxtype, const struct nlattr *head,
-	      int len, const struct nla_policy *policy)
+	      int len, const struct nla_policy *policy,
+	      struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
 	const struct nlattr *nla;
 	int rem, err;
@@ -193,8 +198,11 @@ int nla_parse(struct nlattr **tb, int maxtype, const struct nlattr *head,
 		if (type > 0 && type <= maxtype) {
 			if (policy) {
 				err = validate_nla(nla, maxtype, policy);
-				if (err < 0)
+				if (err < 0) {
+					if (extack)
+						extack->bad_attr = nla;
 					goto errout;
+				}
 			}
 
 			tb[type] = (struct nlattr *)nla;
diff --git a/lib/rhashtable.c b/lib/rhashtable.c
index f8635fd57442..d22a5ef109fb 100644
--- a/lib/rhashtable.c
+++ b/lib/rhashtable.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static void *rhashtable_lookup_one(struct rhashtable *ht,
 	struct rhash_head *head;
 	int elasticity;
 
-	elasticity = ht->elasticity;
+	elasticity = RHT_ELASTICITY;
 	pprev = rht_bucket_var(tbl, hash);
 	rht_for_each_continue(head, *pprev, tbl, hash) {
 		struct rhlist_head *list;
@@ -972,21 +972,6 @@ int rhashtable_init(struct rhashtable *ht,
 	if (params->nelem_hint)
 		size = rounded_hashtable_size(&ht->p);
 
-	/* The maximum (not average) chain length grows with the
-	 * size of the hash table, at a rate of (log N)/(log log N).
-	 * The value of 16 is selected so that even if the hash
-	 * table grew to 2^32 you would not expect the maximum
-	 * chain length to exceed it unless we are under attack
-	 * (or extremely unlucky).
-	 *
-	 * As this limit is only to detect attacks, we don't need
-	 * to set it to a lower value as you'd need the chain
-	 * length to vastly exceed 16 to have any real effect
-	 * on the system.
-	 */
-	if (!params->insecure_elasticity)
-		ht->elasticity = 16;
-
 	if (params->locks_mul)
 		ht->p.locks_mul = roundup_pow_of_two(params->locks_mul);
 	else