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2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE (no-up) Provide a param for allowing the BIOS to handle ↵Brad Figg
changing the brightness on AC/battery status changes. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/949311 We currently carry a SAUCE patch which lets the OS handle the brightness levels automatically when connecting/disconnecting AC. There are some laptops (MSI Wind) for which this doesn't work. Provide a driver param which allows this behaviour to be overriden. Signed-off-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com> Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: Update aufs for build failure caused by apparmor backportJohn Johansen
Fix build failure in aufs introduced by commit 9cd98c046b57cd1bdbd53c3669f6cdd75edffd61 which has been backported from 3.4 as part of the AppArmor 3.4 backport Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rulesJohn Johansen
Base support for network mediation. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add profile introspection file to interfaceJohn Johansen
Add the dynamic profiles file to the interace, to allow load policy introspection. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add the ability to mediate mountJohn Johansen
Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation. The basic form of the rules are. [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path], [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path], [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path], [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path> remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount where [conds] can be fstype=<expr> options=<expr> Example mount commands mount, # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot mount fstype=procfs, # allow mounting procfs anywhere mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar, # readonly bind mount mount /dev/sda -> /mnt, mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**, mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/ umount, umount /m*, See the apparmor userspace for full documentation Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filterWill Drewry
Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet Filter programs works and how it may be used. Includes an example for x86 and a semi-generic example using a macro-based code generator. v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - comment on the ptrace_event use - update arch support comment - note the behavior of SECCOMP_RET_DATA when there are multiple filters (keescook@chromium.org) - lots of samples/ clean up incl 64-bit bpf-direct support (markus@chromium.org) - rebase to linux-next v11: - overhaul return value language, updates (keescook@chromium.org) - comment on do_exit(SIGSYS) v10: - update for SIGSYS - update for new seccomp_data layout - update for ptrace option use v9: - updated bpf-direct.c for SIGILL v8: - add PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the samples. v7: - updated for all the new stuff in v7: TRAP, TRACE - only talk about PR_SET_SECCOMP now - fixed bad JLE32 check (coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com) - adds dropper.c: a simple system call disabler v6: - tweak the language to note the requirement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS being called prior to use. (luto@mit.edu) v5: - update sample to use system call arguments - adds a "fancy" example using a macro-based generator - cleaned up bpf in the sample - update docs to mention arguments - fix prctl value (eparis@redhat.com) - language cleanup (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v4: - update for no_new_privs use - minor tweaks v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - document use of tentative always-unprivileged - guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64 v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net) Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTERWill Drewry
Enable support for seccomp filter on x86: - asm/tracehook.h exists - syscall_get_arguments() works - syscall_rollback() works - ptrace_report_syscall() works - secure_computing() return value is honored (see below) This also adds support for honoring the return value from secure_computing(). SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and SECCOMP_RET_TRAP may result in seccomp needing to skip a system call without killing the process. This is done by returning a non-zero (-1) value from secure_computing. This change makes x86 respect that return value. To ensure that minimal kernel code is exposed, a non-zero return value results in an immediate return to user space (with an invalid syscall number). Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP supportWill Drewry
This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP, and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. The 16-bit SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG. If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified. If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno will be returned to userspace. This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path. Any future efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to address this restriction. v16: - update PT_TRACE_MASK to 0xbf4 so that STOP isn't clear on SETOPTIONS call (indan@nul.nu) [note PT_TRACE_MASK disappears in linux-next] v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes - clean up style (indan@nul.nu) v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc (Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.) v12: - rebase to linux-next - use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency - drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com) v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator (indan@nul.nu) v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP v9: - n/a v8: - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef v7: - introduced Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAPWill Drewry
Adds a new return value to seccomp filters that triggers a SIGSYS to be delivered with the new SYS_SECCOMP si_code. This allows in-process system call emulation, including just specifying an errno or cleanly dumping core, rather than just dying. v15: - use audit_seccomp/skip - pad out error spacing; clean up switch (indan@nul.nu) v14: - n/a v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - rebase on to linux-next v11: - clarify the comment (indan@nul.nu) - s/sigtrap/sigsys v10: - use SIGSYS, syscall_get_arch, updates arch/Kconfig note suggested-by (though original suggestion had other behaviors) v9: - changes to SIGILL v8: - clean up based on changes to dependent patches v7: - introduction Suggested-by: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous.Will Drewry
This change enables SIGSYS, defines _sigfields._sigsys, and adds x86 (compat) arch support. _sigsys defines fields which allow a signal handler to receive the triggering system call number, the relevant AUDIT_ARCH_* value for that number, and the address of the callsite. SIGSYS is added to the SYNCHRONOUS_MASK because it is desirable for it to have setup_frame() called for it. The goal is to ensure that ucontext_t reflects the machine state from the time-of-syscall and not from another signal handler. The first consumer of SIGSYS would be seccomp filter. In particular, a filter program could specify a new return value, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, which would result in the system call being denied and the calling thread signaled. This also means that implementing arch-specific support can be dependent upon HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - reworded changelog (oleg@redhat.com) v11: - fix dropped words in the change description - added fallback copy_siginfo support. - added __ARCH_SIGSYS define to allow stepped arch support. v10: - first version based on suggestion Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNOWill Drewry
This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a seccomp filter. Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower 16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno. 16-bits is more than enough for the errno-base.h calls. Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality for kernel attack surface reduction. For example, a linux container could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop all new ones with errnos. This would keep a logically static attack surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call. v15: - use audit_seccomp and add a skip label. (eparis@redhat.com) - clean up and pad out return codes (indan@nul.nu) v14: - no change/rebase v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - move to WARN_ON if filter is NULL (oleg@redhat.com, luto@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org) - return immediately for filter==NULL (keescook@chromium.org) - change evaluation to only compare the ACTION so that layered errnos don't result in the lowest one being returned. (keeschook@chromium.org) v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@chromium.org) v10: - change loaders to fn v9: - n/a v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value. - reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later. - made the for loop a little less indent-y v7: - introduced Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: seccomp: remove duplicated failure loggingKees Cook
This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more details to the audit log. v15: added a return code to the audit_seccomp path by wad@chromium.org (suggested by eparis@redhat.com) v*: original by keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: seccomp: add system call filtering using BPFWill Drewry
[This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp Complete diff here: https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp A GPG signed tag 'seccomp/v14/posted' will be pushed shortly. ] This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program. This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format of struct seccomp_data. A filter program may be installed by calling: struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... }; ... prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog); The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed. Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve. However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary). There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are as follows: - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired arguments - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible. - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying required for system call policy decisions. Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series. Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be the desired additional functionality. No architectures are enabled in this patch. v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter size (indan@nul.nu) - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu) - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu) - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu) - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu) - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu) - exit_code -> exit_sig v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org) - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation (all of the above: indan@nul.nu) v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com) - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu) - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu) v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com) - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu) - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu) - pare down Kconfig doc reference. - extra comment clean up v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing (hpa@zytor.com) - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch. This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters. (hpa@zytor.com) - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!) v9: - n/a v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu: -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code, -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat. -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch dependencies v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others) - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - merged into seccomp.c - minimal seccomp_filter.h - no config option (part of seccomp) - no new prctl - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h (works but arg access always fails) - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ... - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter installation. (luto@mit.edu) - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com) - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com) - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something) v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org) - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof(). (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu) - update Kconfig description - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com) v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - now uses current->no_new_privs (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com) - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com) - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com) - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com) - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com) - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu v2: - (patch 2 only) Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_archWill Drewry
Adds a stub for a function that will return the AUDIT_ARCH_* value appropriate to the supplied task based on the system call convention. For audit's use, the value can generally be hard-coded at the audit-site. However, for other functionality not inlined into syscall entry/exit, this makes that information available. seccomp_filter is the first planned consumer and, as such, the comment indicates a tie to HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. That is probably an unneeded detail. v14: rebase/nochanges v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: rebase on to linux-next v11: fixed improper return type v10: introduced Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Suggested-by: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.hWill Drewry
Add syscall_get_arch() to export the current AUDIT_ARCH_* based on system call entry path. v14: rebase/nochanges v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedefWill Drewry
Replaces the seccomp_t typedef with struct seccomp to match modern kernel style. v14: rebase/nochanges v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: rebase on to linux-next v8-v11: no changes v7: struct seccomp_struct -> struct seccomp v6: original inclusion in this series. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprogWill Drewry
Any other users of bpf_*_filter that take a struct sock_fprog from userspace will need to be able to also accept a compat_sock_fprog if the arch supports compat calls. This change let's the existing compat_sock_fprog be shared. v14: rebase/nochanges v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: rebase on to linux-next v11: introduction Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_WWill Drewry
Introduces a new BPF ancillary instruction that all LD calls will be mapped through when skb_run_filter() is being used for seccomp BPF. The rewriting will be done using a secondary chk_filter function that is run after skb_chk_filter. The code change is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER which is added, along with the seccomp_bpf_load() function later in this series. This is based on http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/3/2/141 v15: include seccomp.h explicitly for when seccomp_bpf_load exists. v14: First cut using a single additional instruction ... v13: made bpf functions generic. Suggested-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVSJohn Johansen
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: SECCOMP: Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from ↵Andy Lutomirski
granting privs With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc) become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of subverting privileged binaries. This patch completely breaks apparmor. Someone who understands (and uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: [Config] Disable AUFSLeann Ogasawara
Build failure: ubuntu/aufs/i_op.c:701:8: error: too many arguments to function 'security_path_chmod' Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: [Config] Enable aufsTim Gardner
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/943119 https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2012-March/034869.html Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: Input: synapticss - Set buttonpad property for all clickpadsChase Douglas
Signed-off-by: Chase Douglas <chase.douglas@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: Input: synaptics - add second variant of two-button clickpadChase Douglas
This is necessary for clickpad detection of Synaptics trackpads in Dell Mini 10 series of laptops. Signed-off-by: Chase Douglas <chase.douglas@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- update to d266b0c5d0693d6383976ee54b9e2c0fa9a3f5b0Andy Whitcroft
Andy Whitcroft (1): UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- suppress benign plink warning messages J. R. Okajima (10): aufs: headers 1/2, bugfix, where the pr_fmt macro definition aufs: headers 2/2, simply refined aufs: tiny, update the year aufs: update the donator aufs stdalone: include path in Makefile aufs: tiny, update the year aufs: tiny, remove a duplicated header by accident aufs: tiny, restore the removed header files for 2.6.38 make aufs-version 3.2 aufs3.2 20120109 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- sort out the relative header pathsAndy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- adapt to the new changelog handlingAndy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: security: unconditionally chain to Yama LSMKees Cook
This patch forces the LSM to always chain through the Yama LSM regardless of which LSM is selected as the primary LSM. This is not intended for upstream. This is, however, what Ubuntu and ChromeOS are doing. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: Yama: add link restrictionsKees Cook
Add symlink and hardlink restrictions that have shown real-world security benefits, along with sysctl knobs to control them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: ata_piix: defer disks to the Hyper-V drivers by defaultAndy Whitcroft
When we are hosted on a Microsoft Hyper-V hypervisor the guest disks are exposed both via the Hyper-V paravirtualised drivers and via an emulated SATA disk drive. In this case we want to use the paravirtualised drivers if we can as they are much more efficient. Note that the Hyper-V paravirtualised drivers only expose the virtual hard disk devices, the CDROM/DVD devices must still be enumerated. Check the disk type when picking up its ID and if it appears to be a disk just report it disconnected. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/929545 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/942316 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: Add vendor specific ID (0a5c 21f3) for BCM20702A0.Manoj Iyer
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/2/2/220 T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=03 Cnt=03 Dev#= 5 Spd=12 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0a5c ProdID=21f3 Rev=01.12 S: Manufacturer=Broadcom Corp S: Product=BCM20702A0 S: SerialNumber=74DE2B344A7B C: #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=0mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none) I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none) I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=fe(app. ) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none) BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/925552 Signed-off-by: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@canonical.com> Tested-by: Dennis Chua <dennis.chua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: Bluetooth: Add support for BCM20702A0 [0a5c:21e6]James M. Leddy
Add another vendor specific ID for BCM20702A0. output of usb-devices: T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=03 Cnt=04 Dev#= 6 Spd=12 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0a5c ProdID=21e6 Rev=01.12 S: Manufacturer=Broadcom Corp S: Product=BCM20702A0 S: SerialNumber=D0DF9AFB227B C: #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=0mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none) I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none) I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=fe(app. ) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none) BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/906832 Signed-off-by: James M. Leddy <james.leddy@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: Bluetooth: Add support for BCM20702A0 [0a5c:21e1]Manoj Iyer
Add vendor specific ID for BCM20702A0. usb-devices: T: Bus=02 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=05 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=12 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0a5c ProdID=21e1 Rev=01.12 S: Manufacturer=Broadcom Corp S: Product=BCM20702A0 S: SerialNumber=60D819F03A6D C: #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=0mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=fe(app. ) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none) BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/906832 Signed-off-by: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James M. Leddy <james.leddy@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ensure debian/ is not excluded from git by defaultAndy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: ipv6: make the net.ipv6.conf.all.use_tempaddr sysctl ↵Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre
propagate to interface settings The description for IPV6_PRIVACY mentions using .../all/use_tempaddr to enable IPv6 Privacy Extensions, and IP sysctl documentation mentions 'all' as setting all interface-specific settings. We make sure at least use_tempaddr actually works as documented. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <mathieu.trudel-lapierre@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- disable in favor of overlayfsAndy Whitcroft
Remain disabled while we acertain whether there are any hard requirements for aufs that overlayfs cannot handle. Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- enable in config and makefileAndy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- suppress benign plink warning messagesAndy Whitcroft
We are getting a lot of bug reports for unexpectedly high plink counts. This message is benign and not worth reporting as a bug. Suppress. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/621195 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- update to 4cf5db36bcd9748e8e7270022f295f84d1fc2245Andy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- fix undefined security_path_linkAndy Whitcroft
Fix: ERROR: "security_path_link" [ubuntu/aufs/aufs.ko] undefined! Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- fix undefined __devcgroup_inode_permissionAndy Whitcroft
Fix: ERROR: "__devcgroup_inode_permission" [ubuntu/aufs/aufs.ko] undefined! Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- aufs3-standalone.patchAndy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- aufs3-base.patchAndy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- documentation on updating aufs2Andy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- clean up the aufs updater and BOMAndy Whitcroft
Clean up the updater to record and use the real sha1 of the tip of the standalone tree as well as recording and tracking the nominal tip in the changelog for commit generation. Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- update aufs-update to track new locations of headersAndy Whitcroft
Track the new location of the headers as per the commit below: commit de699ab60a2f8a55b9c8313a04c7863897fb88bd Author: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Date: Fri Dec 3 11:12:17 2010 +0000 UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- include the aufs_types.h file in linux-libc-headers Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- include the aufs_types.h file in linux-libc-headersAndy Whitcroft
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/684666 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS -- add BOM and automated update scriptAndy Whitcroft
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: dell-wmi: Demote unknown WMI event message to pr_debugSeth Forshee
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/581312 This message is informational in nature but is causing users to think that there's a problem. Demote to pr_debug to silence it by default. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Acked-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
2012-06-25UBUNTU: SAUCE: include <linux/printk.h> and <stdarg.h> for mmc_core arm buildLeann Ogasawara
Fixes arm build failure: drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/mmc_core.c:142:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'pr_debug' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] include/linux/printk.h:47:2: error: unknown type name 'va_list' Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-30 22:14:10 +0000