21 files changed, 132 insertions, 113 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 35664fe6daa..b9c1219924f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
 	  measurement list.  If unsure, use the default 10.
 
 config IMA_AUDIT
-	bool
+	bool "Enables auditing support"
 	depends on IMA
+	depends on AUDIT
 	default y
 	help
 	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 5690c021de8..5f740f6971e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
+	 ima_policy.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3ccf7acac6d..e7c99fd0d22 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -61,10 +61,19 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
 };
 extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
 /* declarations */
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
 			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+				       const unsigned char *fname,
+				       const char *op, const char *cause,
+				       int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
 
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 88a2788b981..032ff03ad90 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -175,7 +175,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
 	memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
+	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
+	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
 
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
 	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 21e96bf188d..7a57f6769e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
 
 static int ima_audit;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-
 /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
 static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
-#endif
 
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e1aa2b482dd..38477c9c341 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -367,20 +367,11 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 
 	return 0;
 out:
-	securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
-	securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
-	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
-	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
-	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
-	return -1;
-}
-
-void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void)
-{
 	securityfs_remove(violations);
 	securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
 	securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
 	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+	return -1;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 17f1f060306..b5dfd534f13 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -90,8 +90,3 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 
 	return ima_fs_init();
 }
-
-void __exit ima_cleanup(void)
-{
-	ima_fs_cleanup();
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b17be79b9cf..be8294915cf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 	int rc;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
+	unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
 
 	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
 		return;
@@ -75,12 +76,27 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
+	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
+		return;
+
+	/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+	pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (pathbuf) {
+		pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+		if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+			pathname = NULL;
+		else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+			pathname = NULL;
+	}
 	if (send_tomtou)
-		ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
-				  "ToMToU");
+		ima_add_violation(inode,
+				  !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+				  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
 	if (send_writers)
-		ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
-				  "open_writers");
+		ima_add_violation(inode,
+				  !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
+				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
+	kfree(pathbuf);
 }
 
 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -123,6 +139,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -147,8 +164,21 @@ retry:
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
-	if (!rc)
-		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (function != BPRM_CHECK) {
+		/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+		pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (pathbuf) {
+			pathname =
+			    d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+			if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+				pathname = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+	kfree(pathbuf);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 	return rc;
@@ -228,15 +258,11 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	int error;
 
 	error = ima_init();
-	ima_initialized = 1;
+	if (!error)
+		ima_initialized = 1;
 	return error;
 }
 
-static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
-{
-	ima_cleanup();
-}
-
 late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
 
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d8edff209bf..1a9583008aa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c92d42b021a..1c261763f47 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
  *
  * If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
-long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
 	key_serial_t id,
 	const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
 	unsigned ioc,
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
 	struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
 	long ret;
 
-	if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+	if (!_payload_iov || !ioc)
 		goto no_payload;
 
 	ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 3dcbf86b0d3..22ff05269e3 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 #define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK	0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
-extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork);
+extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork);
 
 extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
 extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
 extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
 
 extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
-					  const struct iovec __user *,
+					  const struct iovec *,
 					  unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0f5b3f02729..3364fbf4680 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
 	struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
 	long ret;
 
-	if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+	if (!_payload_iov || !ioc)
 		goto no_payload;
 
 	ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 {
 	struct task_struct *me, *parent;
 	const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
-	struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork;
+	struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork;
 	key_ref_t keyring_r;
 	struct cred *cred;
 	int ret;
@@ -1466,19 +1466,17 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 		return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!newwork)
-		goto error_keyring;
 
 	/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
 	 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
 	 * our parent */
 	cred = cred_alloc_blank();
 	if (!cred)
-		goto error_newwork;
+		goto error_keyring;
+	newwork = &cred->rcu;
 
 	cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
-	init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred);
+	init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring);
 
 	me = current;
 	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1488,6 +1486,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 	oldwork = NULL;
 	parent = me->real_parent;
 
+	task_lock(parent);
 	/* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
 	if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
 		goto unlock;
@@ -1531,20 +1530,15 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 	if (!ret)
 		newwork = NULL;
 unlock:
+	task_unlock(parent);
 	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (oldwork) {
-		put_cred(oldwork->data);
-		kfree(oldwork);
-	}
-	if (newwork) {
-		put_cred(newwork->data);
-		kfree(newwork);
-	}
+	if (oldwork)
+		put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu));
+	if (newwork)
+		put_cred(cred);
 	return ret;
 
-error_newwork:
-	kfree(newwork);
 error_keyring:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_r);
 	return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 7445875f681..81e7852d281 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
 		     const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc)
 	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
+	__acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
 	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
 	unsigned long prealloc;
@@ -960,6 +961,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
 void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type,
 		    unsigned long prealloc)
 	__releases(&keyring->sem)
+	__releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
 	BUG_ON(type == NULL);
 	BUG_ON(type->name == NULL);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 4ad54eea1ea..54339cfd673 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -834,12 +834,11 @@ error:
  * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
  * the target  process is about to resume userspace execution.
  */
-void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork)
+void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
 {
 	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
-	struct cred *new = twork->data;
+	struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);
 
-	kfree(twork);
 	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
 		put_cred(new);
 		return;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 13ae6b0bdd6..689fe2d2216 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2157,8 +2157,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 						get_file(devnull);
 					} else {
 						devnull = dentry_open(
-							dget(selinux_null),
-							mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
+							&selinux_null,
 							O_RDWR, cred);
 						if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
 							devnull = NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index dde2005407a..6d3885165d1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
 extern int selinux_disable(void);
 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
-extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
+extern struct path selinux_null;
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
 extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 3ad29025128..298e695d682 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ out:
 
 #define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
 
-struct dentry *selinux_null;
+struct path selinux_null;
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 					    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 
 	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
 	d_add(dentry, inode);
-	selinux_null = dentry;
+	selinux_null.dentry = dentry;
 
 	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+	selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
 	if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs:  could not mount!\n");
 		err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index cc361b8f3d1..99b36124f71 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 	char		*smk_hat;
 	char		*smk_default;
 	int		smk_initialized;
-	spinlock_t	smk_sblock;	/* for initialization */
 };
 
 struct socket_smack {
@@ -284,6 +283,19 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ */
+static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+	if (!capable(cap))
+		return 0;
+	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * logging functions
  */
 #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 9f3705e9271..db14689a21e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -220,14 +220,9 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
-	 * only one that gets privilege and current does not
-	 * have that label.
+	 * Allow for priviliged to override policy.
 	 */
-	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
-		goto out_audit;
-
-	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
 
 out_audit:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ee0bb5735f3..8221514cc99 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
 	int rc = 0;
 	char *sp = smk_of_current();
 
-	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		return 0;
 
 	 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
@@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 	sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
 	sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
-	spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
 
 	sb->s_security = sbsp;
 
@@ -332,13 +331,10 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	char *commap;
 	char *nsp;
 
-	spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
-	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
-		spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0)
 		return 0;
-	}
+
 	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
-	spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
 
 	for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
 		commap = strchr(op, ',');
@@ -825,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/*
 		 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
@@ -835,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		    smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
 		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
@@ -931,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@@ -1720,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 	 * state into account in the decision as well as
 	 * the smack value.
 	 */
-	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) ||
+	    has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
 	/* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
  out_log:
@@ -2721,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 	if (p != current)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
@@ -2784,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	/*
@@ -2820,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
 #endif
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 1810c9a4ed4..d31e6d957c2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -215,28 +215,27 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
  * @access: access string
  * @rule: Smack rule
  * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @len: label length limit
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure
  */
 static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 				const char *access, struct smack_rule *rule,
-				int import)
+				int import, int len)
 {
-	int rc = -1;
-	int done;
 	const char *cp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	if (import) {
-		rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, 0);
+		rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
 		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
 			return -1;
 
-		rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, 0);
+		rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len);
 		if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
 			return -1;
 	} else {
-		cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, 0);
+		cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
 			return -1;
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -245,7 +244,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 			return -1;
 		rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
 
-		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, 0);
+		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
 			return -1;
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 
 	rule->smk_access = 0;
 
-	for (cp = access, done = 0; *cp && !done; cp++) {
+	for (cp = access; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
 		switch (*cp) {
 		case '-':
 			break;
@@ -282,13 +281,11 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 			rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
 			break;
 		default:
-			done = 1;
-			break;
+			return 0;
 		}
 	}
-	rc = 0;
 
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -304,7 +301,8 @@ static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, int import)
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = smk_fill_rule(data, data + SMK_LABELLEN,
-			   data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import);
+			   data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import,
+			   SMK_LABELLEN);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -340,7 +338,7 @@ static int smk_parse_long_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule,
 		goto free_out_o;
 
 	if (sscanf(data, "%s %s %s", subject, object, access) == 3)
-		rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import);
+		rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import, 0);
 
 	kfree(access);
 free_out_o:
@@ -520,6 +518,9 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
 		return;
 
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		return;
+
 	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
 
 	seq_putc(s, ' ');
@@ -534,8 +535,6 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 		seq_putc(s, 'a');
 	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
 		seq_putc(s, 't');
-	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
-		seq_putc(s, '-');
 
 	seq_putc(s, '\n');
 }
@@ -595,13 +594,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-
 	/*
 	 * Must have privilege.
 	 * No partial writes.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -787,7 +785,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * No partial writes.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1090,7 +1088,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
 	 * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1267,7 +1265,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[80];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1334,7 +1332,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[80];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1412,7 +1410,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[80];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1503,7 +1501,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *data;
 	int rc = count;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1586,7 +1584,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
 	int rc = count;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -1664,7 +1662,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[32];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1885,7 +1883,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	/*
 	 * Must have privilege.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -2051,7 +2049,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	}
 
 	root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
-	root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known);
 
 	return 0;
 }