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Adds seccomp and seccomp_filter status reporting to proc.
/proc/<pid>/seccomp_filter provides the current seccomp mode
and the list of allowed or dynamically filtered system calls.
v9: rebase on to bccaeafd7c117acee36e90d37c7e05c19be9e7bf
v8: -
v7: emit seccomp mode directly
v6: -
v5: fix typos when mailing the wrong patch series
v4: move from rcu guard to mutex guard
v3: changed to using filters directly.
v2: removed status entry, added seccomp file.
(requested by kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com)
allowed S_IRUGO reading of entries
(requested by viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk)
added flags
got rid of the seccomp_t type
dropped seccomp file
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BUG=chromium-os:14496
TEST=see others in series
Change-Id: I86515e56d2da3b3c22ac90856a6ffa71a045c253
Reviewed-on: http://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/3242
Reviewed-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
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Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only
stackable filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of
itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
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This is useful because of the stacking nature of overlayfs. Users like to
find out (via /proc/mounts) which lower/upper directory were used at mount
time.
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
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Add support for statfs to the overlayfs filesystem. As the upper layer
is the target of all write operations assume that the space in that
filesystem is the space in the overlayfs. There will be some inaccuracy as
overwriting a file will copy it up and consume space we were not expecting,
but it is better than nothing.
Use the upper layer dentry and mount from the overlayfs root inode,
passing the statfs call to that filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
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Overlayfs allows one, usually read-write, directory tree to be
overlaid onto another, read-only directory tree. All modifications
go to the upper, writable layer.
This type of mechanism is most often used for live CDs but there's a
wide variety of other uses.
The implementation differs from other "union filesystem"
implementations in that after a file is opened all operations go
directly to the underlying, lower or upper, filesystems. This
simplifies the implementation and allows native performance in these
cases.
The dentry tree is duplicated from the underlying filesystems, this
enables fast cached lookups without adding special support into the
VFS. This uses slightly more memory than union mounts, but dentries
are relatively small.
Currently inodes are duplicated as well, but it is a possible
optimization to share inodes for non-directories.
Opening non directories results in the open forwarded to the
underlying filesystem. This makes the behavior very similar to union
mounts (with the same limitations vs. fchmod/fchown on O_RDONLY file
descriptors).
Usage:
mount -t overlay -olowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/upper overlay /mnt
Supported:
- all operations
Missing:
- ensure that filesystems part of the overlay are not modified outside
the overlay
The following cotributions have been folded into this patch:
Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>:
- minimal remount support
- use correct seek function for directories
- initialise is_real before use
- rename ovl_fill_cache to ovl_dir_read
Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>:
- fix a deadlock in ovl_dir_read_merged
- fix a deadlock in ovl_remove_whiteouts
Erez Zadok <ezk@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
- fix cleanup after WARN_ON
Also thanks to the following people for testing and reporting bugs:
Jordi Pujol <jordipujolp@gmail.com>
Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Michal Suchanek <hramrach@centrum.cz>
Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Erez Zadok <ezk@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
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This reverts commit eabb8d62f6ec4897974548368aa1280e5e726187.
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This reverts commit 70dc86677da31d4ecaf70c5f86cb3881c58594ac.
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This reverts commit 09bcd22c8c6f8a67a38702cf44febd52554ca543.
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This reverts commit 2679353c90924972d3bbe1328042d7e88a794d62.
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readdir"
This reverts commit beb0e0d9ca7db7d3b4e416089b1ef35efabb752d.
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This reverts commit d72ccf8cb287df877221c874efb38f343f671e86.
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This reverts commit 9fa5e35fb1ef0df154866d299b351c5cb25ccf5d.
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[apw@canonical.com: This has no upstream traction but is used by powertop,
so its worth carrying.]
PowerTOP would like to be able to show who is keeping the disk
busy by dirtying data. The most logical spot for this is in the vfs
in the mark_inode_dirty() function. Doing this on the block level
is not possible because by the time the IO hits the block layer the
guilty party can no longer be found ("kjournald" and "pdflush" are not
useful answers to "who caused this file to be dirty).
The trace point follows the same logic/style as the block_dump code
and pretty much dumps the same data, just not to dmesg (and thus to
/var/log/messages) but via the trace events streams.
Note: This patch was posted to lkml and might potentially go into 2.6.33 but I
have not seen which maintainer will take it.
Signed-of-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Kucheria <amit.kucheria@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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If a file only existing on the lower fs is operned for O_RDONLY and
fchmod/fchown/etc is performed on the open file then this will modify
the lower fs, which is not what we want.
Copying up at this point is not possible. The best solution is to
return an error for this corner case and hope applications are not
relying on it.
Reported-by: "J. R. Okajima" <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only
stackable filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of
itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Overlayfs expects ->permission() to not check for readonliness (which
is normally checked by the VFS) and so not return with -EROFS. This
is not true of some filesystems, notably overlayfs itself.
The following patch should fix this by making sure that if the upper
layer is read-only (such as squashfs) then it will mark overlayfs
read-only too and by making ovl_permission() only return EROFS in the
excpetional case where the upper filesystem became r/o after the
overlay was constructed.
Reported-by: Jordi Pujol <jordipujolp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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This is useful because of the stacking nature of overlayfs. Users like to
find out (via /proc/mounts) which lower/upper directory were used at mount
time.
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Add support for statfs to the overlayfs filesystem. As the upper layer
is the target of all write operations assume that the space in that
filesystem is the space in the overlayfs. There will be some inaccuracy as
overwriting a file will copy it up and consume space we were not expecting,
but it is better than nothing.
Use the upper layer dentry and mount from the overlayfs root inode,
passing the statfs call to that filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
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Overlayfs allows one, usually read-write, directory tree to be
overlaid onto another, read-only directory tree. All modifications
go to the upper, writable layer.
This type of mechanism is most often used for live CDs but there's a
wide variety of other uses.
The implementation differs from other "union filesystem"
implementations in that after a file is opened all operations go
directly to the underlying, lower or upper, filesystems. This
simplifies the implementation and allows native performance in these
cases.
The dentry tree is duplicated from the underlying filesystems, this
enables fast cached lookups without adding special support into the
VFS. This uses slightly more memory than union mounts, but dentries
are relatively small.
Currently inodes are duplicated as well, but it is a possible
optimization to share inodes for non-directories.
Opening non directories results in the open forwarded to the
underlying filesystem. This makes the behavior very similar to union
mounts (with the same limitations vs. fchmod/fchown on O_RDONLY file
descriptors).
Usage:
mount -t overlay -olowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/upper overlay /mnt
Supported:
- all operations
Missing:
- ensure that filesystems part of the overlay are not modified outside
the overlay
The following cotributions have been folded into this patch:
Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>:
- minimal remount support
- use correct seek function for directories
- initialise is_real before use
- rename ovl_fill_cache to ovl_dir_read
Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>:
- fix a deadlock in ovl_dir_read_merged
- fix a deadlock in ovl_remove_whiteouts
Erez Zadok <ezk@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
- fix cleanup after WARN_ON
Also thanks to the following people for testing and reporting bugs:
Jordi Pujol <jordipujolp@gmail.com>
Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Michal Suchanek <hramrach@centrum.cz>
Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Erez Zadok <ezk@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Overlayfs needs a private clone of the mount, so create a function for
this and export to modules.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Export do_splice_direct() to modules. Needed by overlay filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Add a new inode operation i_op->open(). This is for stacked
filesystems that want to return a struct file from a different
filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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This is old code with some cruft, all originally by Ingo Molnar with
much later rebasing by Fedora folks and at least one arcane fix by
Roland McGrath a few years ago. No longer uses exec-shield sysctl,
merged with disable_nx. Kees Cook fixed boottime NX reporting for various
corner cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/462111
This patch uses TRACE_EVENT to add tracepoints for the open(),
exec() and uselib() syscalls so that ureadahead can cheaply trace
the boot sequence to determine what to read to speed up the next.
It's not upstream because it will need to be rebased onto the syscall
trace events whenever that gets merged, and is a stop-gap.
Signed-off-by: Scott James Remnant <scott@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tim Gardener <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
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commit a3fbbde70a0cec017f2431e8f8de208708c76acc upstream.
Mountpoint crossing is similar to following procfs symlinks - we do
not get ->d_revalidate() called for dentry we have arrived at, with
unpleasant consequences for NFS4.
Simple way to reproduce the problem in mainline:
cat >/tmp/a.c <<'EOF'
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
main()
{
struct flock fl = {.l_type = F_RDLCK, .l_whence = SEEK_SET, .l_len = 1};
if (fcntl(0, F_SETLK, &fl))
perror("setlk");
}
EOF
cc /tmp/a.c -o /tmp/test
then on nfs4:
mount --bind file1 file2
/tmp/test < file1 # ok
/tmp/test < file2 # spews "setlk: No locks available"...
What happens is the missing call of ->d_revalidate() after mountpoint
crossing and that's where NFS4 would issue OPEN request to server.
The fix is simple - treat mountpoint crossing the same way we deal with
following procfs-style symlinks. I.e. set LOOKUP_JUMPED...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5c8a0fbba543d9428a486f0d1282bbcf3cf1d95a upstream.
No one in their right mind would expect statfs() to not work on a
automounter managed mount point. Fix it.
[ I'm not sure about the "no one in their right mind" part. It's not
mounted, and you didn't ask for it to be mounted. But nobody will
really care, and this probably makes it match previous semantics, so..
- Linus ]
This mirrors the fix made to the quota code in 815d405ceff0d69646.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f992ae801a7dec34a4ed99a6598bbbbfb82af4fb upstream.
The following command sequence triggers an oops.
# mount /dev/sdb1 /mnt
# echo 1 > /sys/class/scsi_device/0\:0\:1\:0/device/delete
# umount /mnt
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU 2
Modules linked in:
Pid: 791, comm: umount Not tainted 3.1.0-rc3-work+ #8 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d0879>] [<ffffffff810d0879>] __lock_acquire+0x389/0x1d60
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810d2845>] lock_acquire+0x95/0x140
[<ffffffff81aed87b>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3b/0x50
[<ffffffff811573bc>] bdi_lock_two+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffff811c2f6c>] bdev_inode_switch_bdi+0x4c/0xf0
[<ffffffff811c3fcb>] __blkdev_put+0x11b/0x1d0
[<ffffffff811c4010>] __blkdev_put+0x160/0x1d0
[<ffffffff811c40df>] blkdev_put+0x5f/0x190
[<ffffffff8118f18d>] kill_block_super+0x4d/0x80
[<ffffffff8118f4a5>] deactivate_locked_super+0x45/0x70
[<ffffffff8119003a>] deactivate_super+0x4a/0x70
[<ffffffff811ac4ad>] mntput_no_expire+0xed/0x130
[<ffffffff811acf2e>] sys_umount+0x7e/0x3a0
[<ffffffff81aeeeab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
This is because bdev holds on to disk but disk doesn't pin the
associated queue. If a SCSI device is removed while the device is
still open, the sdev puts the base reference to the queue on release.
When the bdev is finally released, the associated queue is already
gone along with the bdi and bdev_inode_switch_bdi() ends up
dereferencing already freed bdi.
Even if it were not for this bug, disk not holding onto the associated
queue is very unusual and error-prone.
Fix it by making add_disk() take an extra reference to its queue and
put it on disk_release() and ensuring that disk and its fops owner are
put in that order after all accesses to the disk and queue are
complete.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6d6a435190bdf2e04c9465cde5bdc3ac68cf11a4 upstream.
Ceph users reported that when using Ceph on ext4, the filesystem
would often become corrupted, containing inodes with incorrect
i_blocks counters.
I managed to reproduce this with a very hacked-up "streamtest"
binary from the Ceph tree.
Ceph is doing a lot of xattr writes, to out-of-inode blocks.
There is also another thread which does sync_file_range and close,
of the same files. The problem appears to happen due to this race:
sync/flush thread xattr-set thread
----------------- ----------------
do_writepages ext4_xattr_set
ext4_da_writepages ext4_xattr_set_handle
mpage_da_map_blocks ext4_xattr_block_set
set DELALLOC_RESERVE
ext4_new_meta_blocks
ext4_mb_new_blocks
if (!i_delalloc_reserved_flag)
vfs_dq_alloc_block
ext4_get_blocks
down_write(i_data_sem)
set i_delalloc_reserved_flag
...
up_write(i_data_sem)
if (i_delalloc_reserved_flag)
vfs_dq_alloc_block_nofail
In other words, the sync/flush thread pops in and sets
i_delalloc_reserved_flag on the inode, which makes the xattr thread
think that it's in a delalloc path in ext4_new_meta_blocks(),
and add the block for a second time, after already having added
it once in the !i_delalloc_reserved_flag case in ext4_mb_new_blocks
The real problem is that we shouldn't be using the DELALLOC_RESERVED
state flag, and instead we should be passing
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE down to ext4_map_blocks() instead of
using an inode state flag. We'll fix this for now with using
i_data_sem to prevent this race, but this is really not the right way
to fix things.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fcbb5515825f1bb20b7a6f75ec48bee61416f879 upstream.
The started journal handle should be stopped in failure case.
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5930ea643805feb50a2f8383ae12eb6f10935e49 upstream.
ext4_dx_add_entry manipulates bh2 and frames[0].bh, which are two buffer_heads
that point to directory blocks assigned to the directory inode. However, the
function calls ext4_handle_dirty_metadata with the inode of the file that's
being added to the directory, not the directory inode itself. Therefore,
correct the code to dirty the directory buffers with the directory inode, not
the file inode.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f9287c1f2d329f4d78a3bbc9cf0db0ebae6f146a upstream.
ext4_mkdir calls ext4_handle_dirty_metadata with dir_block and the inode "dir".
Unfortunately, dir_block belongs to the newly created directory (which is
"inode"), not the parent directory (which is "dir"). Fix the incorrect
association.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit bcaa992975041e40449be8c010c26192b8c8b409 upstream.
When ext4_rename performs a directory rename (move), dir_bh is a
buffer that is modified to update the '..' link in the directory being
moved (old_inode). However, ext4_handle_dirty_metadata is called with
the old parent directory inode (old_dir) and dir_bh, which is
incorrect because dir_bh does not belong to the parent inode. Fix
this error.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1cd9f0976aa4606db8d6e3dc3edd0aca8019372a upstream.
This doesn't make much sense, and it exposes a bug in the kernel where
attempts to create a new file in an append-only directory using
O_CREAT will fail (but still leave a zero-length file). This was
discovered when xfstests #79 was generalized so it could run on all
file systems.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a3defbe5c337dbc6da911f8cc49ae3cc3b49b453 upstream.
The case of address space randomization being disabled in runtime through
randomize_va_space sysctl is not treated properly in load_elf_binary(),
resulting in SIGKILL coming at exec() time for certain PIE-linked binaries
in case the randomization has been disabled at runtime prior to calling
exec().
Handle the randomize_va_space == 0 case the same way as if we were not
supporting .text randomization at all.
Based on original patch by H.J. Lu and Josh Boyer.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hongjiu.lu@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1fa1e7f615f4d3ae436fa319af6e4eebdd4026a8 upstream.
Since the commit below which added O_PATH support to the *at() calls, the
error return for readlink/readlinkat for the empty pathname has switched
from ENOENT to EINVAL:
commit 65cfc6722361570bfe255698d9cd4dccaf47570d
Author: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Sun Mar 13 15:56:26 2011 -0400
readlinkat(), fchownat() and fstatat() with empty relative pathnames
This is both unexpected for userspace and makes readlink/readlinkat
inconsistant with all other interfaces; and inconsistant with our stated
return for these pathnames.
As the readlinkat call does not have a flags parameter we cannot use the
AT_EMPTY_PATH approach used in the other calls. Therefore expose whether
the original path is infact entry via a new user_path_at_empty() path
lookup function. Use this to determine whether to default to EINVAL or
ENOENT for failures.
Addresses http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/817187
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unused getname_flags()]
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fc360bd9cdcf875639a77f07fafec26699c546f3 upstream.
The display of the "huge" tag was accidentally removed in 29ea2f698 ("mm:
use walk_page_range() instead of custom page table walking code").
Reported-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a877ee03ac010ded434b77f7831f43cbb1fcc60f upstream.
nfsiostat was failing to find mounted filesystems on kernels after
2.6.38 because of changes to show_vfsstat() by commit
c7f404b40a3665d9f4e9a927cc5c1ee0479ed8f9. This patch adds back the
"device" tag before the nfs server entry so scripts can parse the
mountstats file correctly.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c30e92df30d7d5fe65262fbce5d1b7de675fe34e upstream.
We don't use WANT bits yet--and sending them can probably trigger a
BUG() further down.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3d02fa29dec920c597dd7b7db608a4bc71f088ce upstream.
Yet another open-management regression:
- nfs4_file_downgrade() doesn't remove the BOTH access bit on
downgrade, so the server's idea of the stateid's access gets
out of sync with the client's. If we want to keep an O_RDWR
open in this case, we should do that in the file_put_access
logic rather than here.
- We forgot to convert v4 access to an open mode here.
This logic has proven too hard to get right. In the future we may
consider:
- reexamining the lock/openowner relationship (locks probably
don't really need to take their own references here).
- adding open upgrade/downgrade support to the vfs.
- removing the atomic operations. They're redundant as long as
this is all under some other lock.
Also, maybe some kind of additional static checking would help catch
O_/NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS confusion.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a043226bc140a2c1dde162246d68a67e5043e6b2 upstream.
A client that wants to execute a file must be able to read it. Read
opens over nfs are therefore implicitly allowed for executable files
even when those files are not readable.
NFSv2/v3 get this right by using a passed-in NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE on
read requests, but NFSv4 has gotten this wrong ever since
dc730e173785e29b297aa605786c94adaffe2544 "nfsd4: fix owner-override on
open", when we realized that the file owner shouldn't override
permissions on non-reclaim NFSv4 opens.
So we can't use NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE to tell nfsd_permission to allow
reads of executable files.
So, do the same thing we do whenever we encounter another weird NFS
permission nit: define yet another NFSD_MAY_* flag.
The industry's future standardization on 128-bit processors will be
motivated primarily by the need for integers with enough bits for all
the NFSD_MAY_* flags.
Reported-by: Leonardo Borda <leonardoborda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 576163005de286bbd418fcb99cfd0971523a0c6d upstream.
The set of errors here does *not* agree with the set of errors specified
in the rfc!
While we're there, turn this macros into a function, for the usual
reasons, and move it to the one place where it's actually used.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3e77246393c0a433247631a1f0e9ec98d3d78a1c upstream.
The server is returning nfserr_resource for both permanent errors and
for errors (like allocation failures) that might be resolved by retrying
later. Save nfserr_resource for the former and use delay/jukebox for
the latter.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 832023bffb4b493f230be901f681020caf3ed1f8 upstream.
Fan Yong <yong.fan@whamcloud.com> noticed setting
FMODE_32bithash wouldn't work with nfsd v4, as
nfsd4_readdir() checks for 32 bit cookies. However, according to RFC 3530
cookies have a 64 bit type and cookies are also defined as u64 in
'struct nfsd4_readdir'. So remove the test for >32-bit values.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd.schubert@itwm.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 2da956523526e440ef4f4dd174e26f5ac06fe011 upstream.
nfs_find_and_lock_request will take a reference to the nfs_page and
will then put it if the req is already locked. It's possible though
that the reference will be the last one. That put then can kick off
a whole series of reference puts:
nfs_page
nfs_open_context
dentry
inode
If the inode ends up being deleted, then the VFS will call
truncate_inode_pages. That function will try to take the page lock, but
it was already locked when migrate_page was called. The code
deadlocks.
Fix this by simply refusing the migration request if PagePrivate is
already set, indicating that the page is already associated with an
active read or write request.
We've had a customer test a backported version of this patch and
the preliminary results seem good.
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3236c3e1adc0c7ec83eaff1de2d06746b7c5bb28 upstream.
commit 420e3646 allowed the kernel to reduce the number of unnecessary
commit calls by skipping the commit when there are a large number of
outstanding pages.
However, the current test in nfs_commit_unstable_pages does not handle
the edge condition properly. When ncommit == 0, then that means that the
kernel doesn't need to do anything more for the inode. The current test
though in the WB_SYNC_NONE case will return true, and the inode will end
up being marked dirty. Once that happens the inode will never be clean
until there's a WB_SYNC_ALL flush.
Fix this by immediately returning from nfs_commit_unstable_pages when
ncommit == 0.
Mike noticed this problem initially in RHEL5 (2.6.18-based kernel) which
has a backported version of 420e3646. The inode cache there was growing
very large. The inode cache was unable to be shrunk since the inodes
were all marked dirty. Calling sync() would essentially "fix" the
problem -- the WB_SYNC_ALL flush would result in the inodes all being
marked clean.
What I'm not clear on is how big a problem this is in mainline kernels
as the writeback code there is very different. Either way, it seems
incorrect to re-mark the inode dirty in this case.
Reported-by: Mike McLean <mikem@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c1225158a8dad9e9d5eee8a17dbbd9c7cda05ab9 upstream.
The same function is used by idmap, gss and blocklayout code. Make it
generic.
Signed-off-by: Peng Tao <peng_tao@emc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Rees <rees@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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