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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2014-04-11 16:15:36 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2014-04-11 16:15:36 -0400
commit676d23690fb62b5d51ba5d659935e9f7d9da9f8e (patch)
treef6fbceee43e05c724868153ca37b702fb5e43b8c /net/ipv4
parentad20d5f673898578f9d8a156d7a4c921f5ca4584 (diff)
net: Fix use after free by removing length arg from sk_data_ready callbacks.
Several spots in the kernel perform a sequence like: skb_queue_tail(&sk->s_receive_queue, skb); sk->sk_data_ready(sk, skb->len); But at the moment we place the SKB onto the socket receive queue it can be consumed and freed up. So this skb->len access is potentially to freed up memory. Furthermore, the skb->len can be modified by the consumer so it is possible that the value isn't accurate. And finally, no actual implementation of this callback actually uses the length argument. And since nobody actually cared about it's value, lots of call sites pass arbitrary values in such as '0' and even '1'. So just remove the length argument from the callback, that way there is no confusion whatsoever and all of these use-after-free cases get fixed as a side effect. Based upon a patch by Eric Dumazet and his suggestion to audit this issue tree-wide. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_input.c10
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c2
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c2
3 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index e1661f46fd1..d6b46eb2f94 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4413,7 +4413,7 @@ queue_and_out:
if (eaten > 0)
kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
- sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
return;
}
@@ -4914,7 +4914,7 @@ static void tcp_urg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *t
BUG();
tp->urg_data = TCP_URG_VALID | tmp;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
- sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
}
}
}
@@ -5000,11 +5000,11 @@ static bool tcp_dma_try_early_copy(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
(tcp_flag_word(tcp_hdr(skb)) & TCP_FLAG_PSH) ||
(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > (sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 1))) {
tp->ucopy.wakeup = 1;
- sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
}
} else if (chunk > 0) {
tp->ucopy.wakeup = 1;
- sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
}
out:
return copied_early;
@@ -5275,7 +5275,7 @@ no_ack:
#endif
if (eaten)
kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen);
- sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
return;
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 6379894ec21..438f3b95143 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int tcp_v4_conn_req_fastopen(struct sock *sk,
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
tp->syn_data_acked = 1;
}
- sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(child);
sock_put(child);
WARN_ON(req->sk == NULL);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index ca788ada5bd..05c1b155251 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ int tcp_child_process(struct sock *parent, struct sock *child,
skb->len);
/* Wakeup parent, send SIGIO */
if (state == TCP_SYN_RECV && child->sk_state != state)
- parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
+ parent->sk_data_ready(parent);
} else {
/* Alas, it is possible again, because we do lookup
* in main socket hash table and lock on listening