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[ Upstream commit d376bef9c29b3c65aeee4e785fffcd97ef0a9a81 ]
nft_compat relies on xt_request_find_match to increment
refcount of the module that provides the match/target.
The (builtin) icmp matches did't set the module owner so it
was possible to rmmod ip(6)tables while icmp extensions were still in use.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9ce7bc036ae4cfe3393232c86e9e1fea2153c237 ]
It is a waste of memory to use a full "struct netns_sysctl_ipv6"
while only one pointer is really used, considering netns_sysctl_ipv6
keeps growing.
Also, since "struct netns_frags" has cache line alignment,
it is better to move the frags_hdr pointer outside, otherwise
we spend a full cache line for this pointer.
This saves 192 bytes of memory per netns.
Fixes: c038a767cd69 ("ipv6: add a new namespace for nf_conntrack_reasm")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c568503ef02030f169c9e19204def610a3510918 upstream.
syzbot reports following splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450
net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450 net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
xt_check_match+0x1438/0x1650 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:506
ebt_check_match net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:372 [inline]
ebt_check_entry net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:702 [inline]
The uninitialised access is
xt_mtchk_param->nft_compat
... which should be set to 0.
Fix it by zeroing the struct beforehand, same for tgchk.
ip(6)tables targetinfo uses c99-style initialiser, so no change
needed there.
Reported-by: syzbot+da4494182233c23a5fcf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 55917a21d0cc0 ("netfilter: x_tables: add context to know if extension runs from nft_compat")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ae0ac0ed6fcf5af3be0f63eb935f483f44a402d2 upstream.
instead of allocating each xt_counter individually, allocate 4k chunks
and then use these for counter allocation requests.
This should speed up rule evaluation by increasing data locality,
also speeds up ruleset loading because we reduce calls to the percpu
allocator.
As Eric points out we can't use PAGE_SIZE, page_allocator would fail on
arches with 64k page size.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f28e15bacedd444608e25421c72eb2cf4527c9ca upstream.
Keeps some noise away from a followup patch.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4d31eef5176df06f218201bc9c0ce40babb41660 upstream.
On SMP we overload the packet counter (unsigned long) to contain
percpu offset. Hide this from callers and pass xt_counters address
instead.
Preparation patch to allocate the percpu counters in page-sized batch
chunks.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b078556aecd791b0e5cb3a59f4c3a14273b52121 upstream.
l4proto->manip_pkt() can cause reallocation of skb head so pointer
to the ipv6 header must be reloaded.
Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+10005f4292fc9cc89de7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 58a317f1061c89 ("netfilter: ipv6: add IPv6 NAT support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8 upstream.
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3f34cfae1238848fd53f25e5c8fd59da57901f4b upstream.
Syzbot reported several deadlocks in the netfilter area caused by
rtnl lock and socket lock being acquired with a different order on
different code paths, leading to backtraces like the following one:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
4.15.0-rc9+ #212 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syzkaller041579/3682 is trying to acquire lock:
(sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}, at: [<000000008775e4dd>] lock_sock
include/net/sock.h:1463 [inline]
(sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}, at: [<000000008775e4dd>]
do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.8+0x3c5/0x39d0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:167
but task is already holding lock:
(rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000004342eaa9>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893
mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
register_netdevice_notifier+0xad/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1607
tee_tg_check+0x1a0/0x280 net/netfilter/xt_TEE.c:106
xt_check_target+0x22c/0x7d0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:845
check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:538 [inline]
find_check_entry.isra.7+0x935/0xcf0
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:580
translate_table+0xf52/0x1690 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:749
do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1165 [inline]
do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x370/0x5f0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1691
nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
ipv6_setsockopt+0x115/0x150 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:928
udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422
sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2978
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0
-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}:
lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3914
lock_sock_nested+0xc2/0x110 net/core/sock.c:2780
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1463 [inline]
do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.8+0x3c5/0x39d0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:167
ipv6_setsockopt+0xd7/0x150 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:922
udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422
sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2978
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(rtnl_mutex);
lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6);
lock(rtnl_mutex);
lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syzkaller041579/3682:
#0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000004342eaa9>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
The problem, as Florian noted, is that nf_setsockopt() is always
called with the socket held, even if the lock itself is required only
for very tight scopes and only for some operation.
This patch addresses the issues moving the lock_sock() call only
where really needed, namely in ipv*_getorigdst(), so that nf_setsockopt()
does not need anymore to acquire both locks.
Fixes: 22265a5c3c10 ("netfilter: xt_TEE: resolve oif using netdevice notifiers")
Reported-by: syzbot+a4c2dc980ac1af699b36@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 92b4423e3a0bc5d43ecde4bcad871f8b5ba04efd upstream.
This is a forward-port of the original patch from Andrzej Hajda,
he said:
"IS_ERR_VALUE should be used only with unsigned long type.
Otherwise it can work incorrectly. To achieve this function
xt_percpu_counter_alloc is modified to return unsigned long,
and its result is assigned to temporary variable to perform
error checking, before assigning to .pcnt field.
The patch follows conclusion from discussion on LKML [1][2].
[1]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2120927
[2]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2150581"
Original patch from Andrzej is here:
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/582970/
This patch has clashed with input validation fixes for x_tables.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
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commit cc31d43b4154ad5a7d8aa5543255a93b7e89edc2 upstream.
Otherwise, RST packets generated by ipt_REJECT always have mark 0 when
the routing is checked later in the same code path.
Fixes: e110861f8609 ("net: add a sysctl to reflect the fwmark on replies")
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pau Espin Pedrol <pau.espin@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 83170f3beccccd7ceb4f9a0ac0c4dc736afde90c upstream.
With the commit 48e8aa6e3137 ("ipv6: Set FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH at
flowi6_flags") ip6_pol_route() callers were asked to to set the
FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH properly and xt_TEE was updated accordingly,
but with the later refactor in commit bbde9fc1824a ("netfilter:
factor out packet duplication for IPv4/IPv6") the flowi6_flags
update was lost.
This commit re-add it just before the routing decision.
Fixes: bbde9fc1824a ("netfilter: factor out packet duplication for IPv4/IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f4dc77713f8016d2e8a3295e1c9c53a21f296def upstream.
The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken,
most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains().
In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require
several minutes.
sample ruleset that shows the behaviour:
echo "*filter"
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i
done
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
done
echo COMMIT
[ pipe result into iptables-restore ]
This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches
though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever
(gave up after 10 minutes)
Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an
array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct,
then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not.
After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one
gets when reverting 36472341017529e (~3 seconds on my workstation).
[1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get
300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries
Fixes: 36472341017529e ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps")
Reported-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5a63643e583b6a9789d7a225ae076fb4e603991c ]
This reverts commit 1d6119baf0610f813eb9d9580eb4fd16de5b4ceb.
After reverting commit 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API
for fragmentation mem accounting") then here is no need for this
fix-up patch. As percpu_counter is no longer used, it cannot
memory leak it any-longer.
Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce upstream.
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a
helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 09d9686047dbbe1cf4faa558d3ecc4aae2046054 upstream.
This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix.
Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few
sanity tests that are done in the normal path.
For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies.
While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more
copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as
e->target_offset differs in the compat case.
Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two
places need to be checked and kept in sync.
At a high level 32 bit compat works like this:
1- initial pass over blob:
validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking
lookup all matches and targets
do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures
assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel
implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.)
2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to
contain the translated ruleset
3- second pass over original blob:
for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated
memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g.
adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc).
4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps)
5-first pass over translated blob:
call the checkentry function of all matches and targets.
The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the
compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step
rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement.
In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel
representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name .
This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit
iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the
'native' sanity checks.
This has two drawbacks:
1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even
though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets.
2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target.
THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations
provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code.
iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form
-A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002
-A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003
shows no noticeable differences in restore times:
old: 0m30.796s
new: 0m31.521s
64bit: 0m25.674s
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0188346f21e6546498c2a0f84888797ad4063fc5 upstream.
Always returned 0.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 329a0807124f12fe1c8032f95d8a8eb47047fb0e upstream.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c upstream.
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc1221b3a163d1386d1052184202d5dc50d302d1 upstream.
32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once
more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject
well-formed 32bit rulesets.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aa412ba225dd3bc36d404c28cdc3d674850d80d0 upstream.
Once we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it
becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob
or a normal one.
Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry,
compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current
incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7d35812c3214afa5b37a675113555259cfd67b98 upstream.
Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that
the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and
that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule.
Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient.
To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current
checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 36472341017529e2b12573093cc0f68719300997 upstream.
When we see a jump also check that the offset gets us to beginning of
a rule (an ipt_entry).
The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases.
300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain:
[ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]:
Before:
real 0m24.874s
user 0m7.532s
sys 0m16.076s
After:
real 0m27.464s
user 0m7.436s
sys 0m18.840s
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f24e230d257af1ad7476c6e81a8dc3127a74204e upstream.
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Base chains enforce absolute verdict.
User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return,
xtables userspace adds them automatically.
But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 upstream.
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91 upstream.
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617 upstream.
We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
netfilter fixes for net
The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for you net tree,
specifically for nf_tables and nfnetlink_queue, they are:
1) Avoid a compilation warning in nfnetlink_queue that was introduced
in the previous merge window with the simplification of the conntrack
integration, from Arnd Bergmann.
2) nfnetlink_queue is leaking the pernet subsystem registration from
a failure path, patch from Nikolay Borisov.
3) Pass down netns pointer to batch callback in nfnetlink, this is the
largest patch and it is not a bugfix but it is a dependency to
resolve a splat in the correct way.
4) Fix a splat due to incorrect socket memory accounting with nfnetlink
skbuff clones.
5) Add missing conntrack dependencies to NFT_DUP_IPV4 and NFT_DUP_IPV6.
6) Traverse the nftables commit list in reverse order from the commit
path, otherwise we crash when the user applies an incremental update
via 'nft -f' that deletes an object that was just introduced in this
batch, from Xin Long.
Regarding the compilation warning fix, many people have sent us (and
keep sending us) patches to address this, that's why I'm including this
batch even if this is not critical.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK=m
CONFIG_NF_DUP_IPV4=y
results in:
net/built-in.o: In function `nf_dup_ipv4':
>> (.text+0xd434f): undefined reference to `nf_conntrack_untracked'
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.
To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
addresses.
Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/
but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch fixes following problems :
1) percpu_counter_init() can return an error, therefore
init_frag_mem_limit() must propagate this error so that
inet_frags_init_net() can do the same up to its callers.
2) If ip[46]_frags_ns_ctl_register() fail, we must unwind
properly and free the percpu_counter.
Without this fix, we leave freed object in percpu_counters
global list (if CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU) leading to crashes.
This bug was detected by KASAN and syzkaller tool
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This is needed in openvswitch to fix an skb leak in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joestringer@nicira.com>
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Conflicts:
net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c
net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
net/openvswitch/vport-gre.c
net/openvswitch/vport-vxlan.c
net/openvswitch/vport.c
net/openvswitch/vport.h
The openvswitch conflicts were overlapping changes. One was
the egress tunnel info fix in 'net' and the other was the
vport ->send() op simplification in 'net-next'.
The xfrm6_output.c conflicts was also a simplification
overlapping a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a78 ("bridge: Remove
br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve
netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's
net-next tree.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Conflicts:
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
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since commit 8405a8fff3f8 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on
nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded.
So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is
removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Correct whitespace layout of a pointer casting.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Correct whitespace layout of if statements.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Correct whitespace layout of ternary operators in the netfilter-ipv6
code.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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This patch cleanses whitespace around arithmetical operators.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Use tabs instead of spaces to indent code.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Use tabs instead of spaces to indent second line of parameters in
function definitions.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Whitespace cleansing: Labels should not be indented.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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The function nf_ct_frag6_gather is called on both the input and the
output paths of the networking stack. In particular ipv6_defrag which
calls nf_ct_frag6_gather is called from both the the PRE_ROUTING chain
on input and the LOCAL_OUT chain on output.
The addition of a net parameter makes it explicit which network
namespace the packets are being reassembled in, and removes the need
for nf_ct_frag6_gather to guess.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Stop hidding the sk parameter with an inline helper function and make
all of the callers pass it, so that it is clear what the function is
doing.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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net/built-in.o: In function `nf_dup_ipv4': (.text+0xed24d): undefined reference to `nf_conntrack_untracked'
net/built-in.o: In function `nf_dup_ipv4': (.text+0xed267): undefined reference to `nf_conntrack_untracked'
net/built-in.o: In function `nf_dup_ipv6': (.text+0x158aef): undefined reference to `nf_conntrack_untracked'
net/built-in.o: In function `nf_dup_ipv6': (.text+0x158b09): undefined reference to `nf_conntrack_untracked'
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Don't make ip6_route_me_harder guess which network namespace
it is routing in, pass the network namespace in.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Use nf_ct_net(ct) instead of guessing that the netdevice out can
reliably report the network namespace the conntrack operation is
happening in.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Instead of calling dev_net on a likley looking network device
pass state->net into nf_xfrm_me_harder.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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